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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper considers efforts to regulate (and to prevent the
regulation of) the $100 trillion-plus global market for financial de-
rivatives.' It divides the universe of derivatives regulation into
four categories of rule making-statutory, judicial, private, and ar-
bitral-and proposes changes within each category.
First, the greatest source of uncertainty in the derivatives mar-
ket is the complex web of statutory regimes that govern (or do not
* Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. I am grateful to the Uni-
versity of San Diego for financial support.
1 Derivatives are financial instruments, such as options and forward con-
tracts, whose value is derived from some underlying instrument or index. For a
detailed description of the classes and uses of derivatives, see Frank Partnoy, Fi-
nancial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L 211, 216-27
(1997) [hereinafter Partnoy, Regulatory Arbitrage]. Derivatives may be traded on
an exchange or over-the-counter ("OTC'" in private transactions. The Bank for
International Settlements ("BIS") has estimated that the size of the OTC deriva-
tives market in notional amounts as of year-end 1999 was approximately $83.2
trillion. See Press Release, Bank for International Settlements, The Global OTC
Derivatives Market at End-December 1999 (May 18, 2000), at http://wwiwi
.bis.org/press/p000518.htm. Interestingly, the gross market values of these con-
tracts has declined dramatically from 4.02% of the notional amounts at year-end
1998 to 3.19% of the notional amounts at year-end 1999, a decline of more than
20%. See id. This decline in market value may be a sign of very large losses in the
industry during 1999, a fact that is very difficult to ascertain. Trading in OTC de-
rivatives is highly concentrated, with the world s ten largest banks accounting for
almost 90% of OTC derivatives activity worldwide. ALFRID STENHEM,
DERIVATIVES: THE WILED BEAST OF FINANcE 155 (rev. ed. 2000). The BIS also has es-
timated that the OTC derivatives market comprises approximately 86' of the
overall derivatives market. Id. at 152-53. Estimates of the size in notional amount
of the exchange-traded derivatives market are in the $13 to $14 trillion range. Id.
at 153. Hence, the total size in notional amount of the derivatives industry is
greater than $100 trillion.
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govern) the purchase and sale of derivatives. Derivatives are
regulated by multiple laws under multiple regulatory jurisdictions.
Many classes of derivatives are not regulated at all. Many pockets
of the derivatives market exist precisely because of the range of
nonsensical and costly statutory applications, as a result of so-
called "regulatory arbitrage" transactions. It is increasingly diffi-
cult to determine whether, under the applicable tests, a particular
instrument is a "security," a "future," or neither. Derivatives may
be economically equivalent to securities or futures but fit under
different statutory regimes or none at all. Competition between
the regulatory regimes has not led to the efficiencies predicted by
scholars who advocated expanded regulatory competition. To the
contrary, competition has led to an inefficient turf battle and costly
uncertainty. In late December 2000, Congress passed legislation
permitting trading of individual stock futures and clarifying cer-
tain swap exemptions. I will explain some of this legislation's
drawbacks.
Second, because many derivatives contracts are outside the
scope of federal statutory regimes, courts-often state courts-are
beginning to decide complex derivatives disputes based on com-
mon law principles. I argue that such common law adjudication
has failed in several ways. It is extraordinarily expensive to re-
solve these disputes, and there are few published decisions to
guide future parties. Facts are difficult to ascertain, and com-
plaints and judicial opinions often do not accurately describe the
underlying transactions. Jurisdictional battles are fierce and costly.
Documents are not available or are under seal, and much impor-
tant evidence is destroyed or is otherwise unavailable by the time
discovery begins. The result is an expensive, inefficient, unfair,
and uncertain process. I analyze and critique several recent de-
rivatives disputes in which judges have attempted to apply state
common law principles (e.g., breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, lack
of authority).
Third, derivatives dealers have created a robust system of pri-
vate law embodied in the standard form contracts used in the over-
the-counter derivatives transactions. I argue that these contracts
are structured to ensure that the transactions are neither subject to
federal regulation nor susceptible to challenge under state common
law. I criticize the standard form contract created by the Interna-
tional Swap Dealers Association ("ISDA") and argue that non-
[22:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol22/iss3/1
SHIFTING CONTOURS
reliance provisions (i.e., disclaimers) in such contracts should pro-
vide only narrow protection to dealers and should not preclude
claims based on inaccurate or misleading material representations
or omissions by dealers.
Fourth, given the problems associated with the alternative
means of resolving disputes, one might expect derivatives coun-
terparties to agree to resolve disputes through arbitration. Yet ar-
bitration of such disputes is rare. One reason may be that deriva-
tives sellers fear the uncertainty associated with an arbitrator even
more than they fear a judge. Another reason may be that dealers
prefer the courts precisely because they are more expensive. In
court, a dealer can force a plaintiff to engage in expensive litiga-
tion, which the dealer easily can afford but which the plaintiff may
find more difficult to sustain (at a typical cost of several hundred
thousand dollars per month). Dealers also benefit from delay. I
attempt to explain why so few derivatives disputes are resolved in
arbitration, and I suggest circumstances under which arbitration
might be preferable.
Section 2 frames the discussion by describing the general diffi-
culties associated with line-drawing in the global derivatives mar-
ket Section 3 specifically analyzes the four approaches to regula-
tion. The $100 trillion market for financial derivatives is subject to
piecemeal statutory regulation, or none at all (as described in Sec-
tion 3.1.), and the development of common law in this area has
been slow and sporadic (as described in Section 3.2.). Private con-
tracting, while extensive, has failed to ameliorate these problems
(as described in Section 3.3.). Private parties who have specified
arbitral rules in advance are subject to even less certainty than par-
ties with disputes resolved based on common law (as described in
Section 3.4.). Section 4 suggests and assesses a proposal for a sys-
tem that might avoid some of the problems of existing regulatory
approaches by having parties agree ex ante to be bound by hypo-
thetical cases specified in their contracts (i.e., synthetic common
law).
2. LINE-DRAWING IN THE GLOBAL DERIVATIVES MARKE
Derivatives are notoriously difficult to categorize. Part of the
problem is the ambiguous meaning of the term "derivative." The
2001]
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definition typically2 given by legal academics and commentators in
the area is not particularly helpful: a derivative is a financial in-
strument whose value is based on (or "derived" from) some un-
derlying instrument or index.3 According to this definition, nearly
all financial instruments are derivatives. 4
In more precise economic terms, derivatives include two basic
classes of instruments: options and forwards. Both are financial
contracts, the primary difference being that options are "rights,"
whereas forwards also include "obligations." S
For example, a call option is the right to buy some underlying
instrument at a specified time and price.6 An investor might pur-
chase a call option on IBM stock with an exercise price of $100 and
an exercise date of one year from today. Such an investor would
have the right, but not the obligation, to buy IBM stock during the
next year for $100. If the price of IBM increased, the value of the
call option also would increase. If after one year the price of IBM
were below $100, the option would expire worthless.
In contrast, a forward is the right and the obligation to buy or
sell some underlying instrument at a specified time and price. A
baker might buy a forward contract on a bushel of wheat with a
forward price of $100 and a delivery date of one year from today.
In this case, if the value of the wheat increased the baker would
make money on the forward contract, and these gains would offset
the increase in the cost of the higher-priced wheat. Conversely, if
the value of the wheat decreased the baker would lose money on
the forward contract, but these losses would be offset by gains as-
sociated with buying lower-priced wheat.
2 The popular definition is not used by regulators, who define derivatives in
increasingly obtuse and nonsensical ways. See infra Section 3.1.
3 See, e.g., Partnoy, Regulatory Arbitrage, supra note 1, at 212 n.2 (discussing
various definitions of derivatives).
4 Even stocks and bonds can be thought of as derivatives. See generally
Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J.
POL. EcoN. 637, 637 (1973) (describing equity as a call option).
5 See Frank Partnoy, Adding Derivatives to the Corporate Law Mix, 34 GA. L.
REv. 599, 604,607 (2000) [hereinafter Partnoy, Corporate Law Mix].
6 Whereas a call option is the right to buy, a put option is the right to sell. For
a detailed and colorful description of the various option payouts, including dia-
grams, see Peter H. Huang, Teaching Corporate Law from an Option Perspective, 34
GA. L. REv. 571 (2000).
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There are additional complexities to derivatives. 7 The pur-
chaser of the call option in the previous example could purchase
the option either through an exchange or from another private
party.8 Similarly, the baker could purchase a forward contract ei-
ther though an exchange (in which case it would be called a future)
or from another private party. In addition, the simple examples of
options and forwards can be combined in all sorts of complicated
and fantastic ways.9 Many derivatives are off-balance sheet and
thus escape scrutiny °
In the option example, the investor was using derivatives to
speculate on the price of IBM stock. In the forward example, the
baker was using derivatives to hedge the risk of an increase in the
7 The existence of derivatives means that traditional financial market labels-
such as "equity" and "debt"-are now potentially meaningless. For example,
suppose a particular legal rule applies only to the "equity" of a firm. Examples
include the duties of care and loyalty, which the managers of a firm generally owe
to the firm's shareholders (e.g., equity), but not to the firm's other stakeholders
(e.g., debt). However, what constitutes "equity" may vary from firm to firm in
ways that make the legal rules inconsistent See Partnoy, Corporate Law Mix, supra
note 5, at 608-16.
S The private transaction is classified as OTC.
9 For examples of exotic derivatives and the complexities of the valuation is-
sues associated with them, see PAUL WILMOTT, DERIVATIVES: THE THEORY AND
PRACncE OF FINANCIAL ENGmnEERING 34-41 (1998). Even complex combinations of
options and forwards may not create "complete" markets. See Peter H. Huang, A
Normative Analysis of New Financially Engineered Derivatives, 73 S. CAL. L RE%,. 471,
498-500 (2000). More complex derivatives generally are more profitable for the
derivatives dealers who sell them. See, e.g., STENFMU, supra note 1, at 160 ("More
complicated products are more profitable and therefore more attractive to deal-
ers."). Financier George Soros has expressed unease about the dangers in com-
plex aspects of the derivatives market:
The explosive growth in derivative instruments holds other dangers.
There are so many of them, and some of them are so esoteric, that the
risks involved may not be properly understood even by the most so-
phisticated of investors. Some of these instruments appear to be specifi-
cally designed to enable institutional investors to take gambles which
they would otherwise not be permitted to take .... And some other in-
struments offer exceptional returns because they carry the seeds of a total
wipeout
GEORGE SOROS, SOROS ON SOROS 313-14 (1995).
10 See STEINHERR, supra note 1, at 159 (describing off-balance sheet treatment
and noting that for major commercial banks, including Chase Manhattan and
Morgan Guaranty, the notional value of off-balance sheet derivatives represents
forty to fifty times the value of their balance sheet assets).
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cost of wheat. Speculating and hedging are two of the primary
uses of derivatives."
A third use of derivatives-arbitrage, including regulatory ar-
bitrage-presents additional difficulties. True arbitrage is the si-
multaneous, riskless purchase and sale of economically equivalent
instruments for profit. True arbitrage rarely exists, but derivatives
frequently are used to make arbitrage-like bets that economically
similar instruments will converge in price. These bets are vari-
ously known as risk arbitrage, convergence trades, or relative
value trades.
A particular type of arbitrage, regulatory arbitrage, involves
the use of derivatives to avoid costly regulation. Regulatory arbi-
trage involves purchases and sales of financial instruments de-
signed to capture the difference in regulatory costs applicable to
two economically equivalent assets.12 Private parties often use de-
rivatives for regulatory arbitrage, a fact that makes the job of de-
fining derivatives more difficult, especially for regulators, because
to the extent a regulatory cost is imposed on a class of instruments,
there is an incentive for market participants to create economically
equivalent derivative assets that avoid the regulatory cost.
Disputes in the financial market have involved all three uses of
derivatives. The disputes have occurred in waves, typically after
some major economic dislocation (e.g., an increase in interest rates
or dramatic change in foreign exchange rates) causes market par-
ticipants to sustain losses large enough to lead them to sue. Not all
derivatives losses are relevant here. 13 An early round of deriva-
11 See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Derivatives, Corporate Hedging, and Share-
holder Wealth: Modigliani-Miller Forty Years Later, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 1039 (hedg-
ing); Lynn A. Stout, Betting the Bank: How Derivatives Trading Under Conditions of
Uncertainty Can Increase Risks and Erode Returns in Financial Markets, 21 J. CORP. L.
53 (1995) (speculating).
12 See generally Partnoy, Regulatory Arbitrage, supra note 1, at 216-27 (describ-
ing the classes and uses of derivatives). For example, a simple regulatory arbi-
trage transaction could involve buying an untaxed asset and selling an economi-
cally equivalent taxed asset.
13 For example, although one publicized case, involving billion dollar losses
by Nicholas Leeson of Barings Bank, has raised numerous regulatory and policy
issues about derivatives, the Barings losses are not relevant here, because the
losses did not involve a dispute between the purchaser and seller of the financial
contracts. It is worth noting, however, that in December 1995 a Singapore court
sentenced Nick Leeson to six and a half years in prison for fraud and for falsifying
certain reports sent to SIMEX, the relevant exchange in Singapore. See Michael S.
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tives losses, which led to the first major wave of derivatives cases,
followed soon after when the Federal Reserve increased interest
rates six times in early 1994.14 Another wave followed the Asia cri-
sis of 1997, when several Asian currencies collapsed.15
Before 1994, numerous companies throughout the world had
purchased derivatives contracts, including swap transactions, that
essentially were bets that short-term rates would remain low.
There were numerous ways to place this bet using derivatives. The
most straightforward way would have been either to enter into a
simple interest rate option or forward contract,16 betting that rates
would not increase. Another would have been to enter into a sim-
ple U.S. dollar interest rate swap, pursuant to which the company
would agree to pay a short-term floating interest rate and to re-
ceive a fixed interest rate, each as a percentage of some fixed, no-
tional amount.
For example, if in 1993 Procter & Gamble ("P&G") had believed
interest rates would remain low (or if it had wanted to convert
fixed rate liabilities into floating rate liabilities), it could have en-
tered into an interest rate swap transaction with Bankers Trust,
agreeing to pay every three months a short-term floating interest
rate (e.g., LIBOR, the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate) times $100
million and to receive, say, 5% of $100 million, or $5 million. Then,
if interest rates remained low, P&G would make money every
quarter on its swap; if interest rates increased, it might lose money.
Such swaps, known as "plain vanilla" interest rate swaps, are
very common, are relatively low risk, and are transacted in a com-
petitive, transparent market17 Unfortunately for the banks bro-
Bennett & Michael J. Matin, The Casablanca Paradigm: Regulatory Risk in M1e Asian
Financial Derivatives Markets, 5 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1, 5 (1999).
14 These increases followed an extended period during which short-term US.
interest rates had remained very low. During that period, many market partici-
pants made short-sighted bets that these rates would remain low based on histori-
cal performance.
15 These collapses followed an extended period during which Asian foreign
exchange rates were very stable. During that period, many market participants
made short-sighted bets that these rates would remain stable based on historical
performance.
16 Interest rate option and forward contracts are traded on exchanges,
whereas many of the transactions underlying the derivatives disputes during this
period were based on similar OTC transactions.
17 See generally STINHERR, supra note 1, at 154 (discussing the benefits of plain
vanilla instruments).
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kering such swaps, the large size and competitive nature of that
market means that such swaps are a relatively unattractive low-
margin business. The greatest growth in derivatives has been in
swaps and other OTC derivatives, whereas "plain vanilla" trades
have become less profitable in recent years.'8
However, derivatives disputes, especially those involving
large, well-publicized losses, typically do not involve these simple
financial contracts. Instead, they more often involve more complex
swaps and structured transactions, which are neither liquid nor
transparent and which generate very large profits for dealers.
In sum, although derivatives are difficult to categorize, deriva-
tives disputes typically have involved transactions that were both,
on average, more complex for the purchaser and more profitable to
the seller. Frequently, these transactions were composed of several
simpler parts, which could have been sold separately in a small
number of more straightforward transactions. "Plain vanilla"
transactions are rarely disputed.
3. FOUR APPROACHES TO GLOBAL DERIVATIVES REGULATION
Thus far, I have described only the economic complexities of fi-
nancial derivatives, without mentioning the applicable regulatory
regimes. Unfortunately, these regimes do not track the economic
attributes of derivatives and often seriously contradict them.1 9
The result is that the derivatives market is fraught with uncer-
tainty.20 Frank Knight has distinguished between risk (which has
an observable probability distribution) and uncertainty (which
does not).21 Markets deal well with risk but not with uncertainty.
Some investors (in some instances including sophisticated deriva-
18 See STEINHERR, supra note 1, at 161 (noting increase in use of OTC deriva-
fives by non-financial institutions from $7.5 trillion in 1995 to $11 trillion in 1998).
19 This regulatory tension creates additional incentives for regulatory arbi-
trage transactions.
20 See Kathleen Day, The Derivatives Dilemma; Oversight Dispute Leaves Con-
tracts in Perilous Limbo, WASH. PosT, June 2, 2000, at E2 (describing the legal status
of derivatives as "murky"); Michael Schroeder, Lugar in Senate Charges CFTC, SEC
Impede Bill to Deregulate Derivatives, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2000, at C26 (describing
current legal and regulatory uncertainty and legislation proposed to reduce it).
See generally Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa Vinciguerra, Financial Innovation and Un-
certain Regulation: Selected Issues Regarding New Product Development, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 1431 (1991) (discussing uncertainty in regulation of new financial products).
21 See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT ch. 7 (1921).
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tives market participants) face uncertainty in valuing complex de-
rivatives.22 Others understand derivatives well enough to evaluate
their market risks but face uncertainty in assessing other aspects of
the transactions, including potential liability in a future dispute.
Much of the uncertainty in the derivatives market stems from
regulation, and the OTC markets are among the least certain.
This Section assesses how the four regulatory alternatives have
addressed derivatives disputes (or have failed to do so). Statutory
coverage is piecemeal, byzantine, and has led market participants
to opt out of the statutory framework when dealing in the OTC
markets. The common law, then, has been left to resolve these dis-
putes, and it has performed abysmally. Private law has worked to
insulate market participants from regulatory coverage and, poten-
tially, from liability in disputes but has failed to clarify transaction
terms relevant to disputes. Arbitration has played only a limited
role and has provided even less certainty.
3.1. Piecemeal Regulation of Derivatives by Statute
The greatest source of uncertainty in the derivatives market is
the complex web of statutory regimes that govern (or do not gov-
ern) derivatives purchases and sales. Derivatives are regulated by
multiple laws under multiple regulatory jurisdictions.23 Many
classes of derivatives are not regulated at all. Many pockets of the
derivatives market exist precisely because of the range of nonsensi-
cal and costly statutory applications. This Section is an attempt to
explain some of the different aspects of those statutory regimes.
There are two primary sets of federal statutes 4 and agencies
regulating derivatives.25 First, the Securities and Exchange Com-
22 See STEINHERR, supra note 1, at 191-92:
There are significant difficulties in understanding, pricing and managing
inherently complex derivative instruments, particularly longer-dated in-
struments, for example currency options. The statistical and mathemati-
cal techniques that underlie pricing and trading strategies are based on
the assumption that historical distributions of price changes are good
guides to future volatility. Uncertainty about the value of derivative po-
sitions may lead to liquidation sales in declining markets ....
Id.
23 See, e.g., HAmiLTON Er AL., A GUIDE TO FEDERAL REGULATION OF DERIVATiwES
9 (1998).
24 Not all derivatives disputes with federal statutory claims involve either of
these two statutes (the securities and commodities statutes). Plaintiffs in recent
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mission ("SEC") regulates "securities"26 (which include stocks,
bonds, and options), pursuant to the 1933 Securities Act27 and 1934
derivatives disputes have alleged other novel theories, even including violations
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). These alle-
gations were made together with allegations of common law fraud. See Sumitomo
Copper Swaps Complaint Seeks $1.5B from Chase Manhattan, DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP.,
Jan. 24, 2000, at 6 (noting the inclusion of a RICO claim). One leading derivatives
case was decided under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA").
In that case, Laborers National Pension Fund v. American National Bank & Trust Co.,
173 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 967 (1999), the Fifth Circuit ruled
that a pension fund s investment in Interest Only ("10') strips did not violate the
prudent investment standards contained in ERISA. See Trying to Recoup Losses,
Fund Fails to Win Sup. Ct. Review, SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP., Jan. 12, 2000, at 6. Labor-
ers National Pension Fund ("LNPF") lost $4.2 million on 1Os it bought from
American National Bank. LNPF sued in the Northern District of Texas, and the
district court found the investments violated ERISA and awarded damages of $7.1
million. However, the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that although IOs are vola-
tile, they were only 6.5% of the fund s portfolio and served to hedge other por-
tions of the fund. See id.
25 Other federal agencies, including the Federal Reserve Board, also play a
role in the regulation of derivatives. Most prominently, the Fed plays an active
role in system-wide concerns about risk, as it did in the recent near-collapse of
hedge-fund Long-Term Capital Management. See Peter H. Huang, Kimberly D.
Krawiec & Frank Partnoy, Derivatives on TV: A Tale of Two Derivatives Debacles in
Prime-Time, 4 THE GREEN BAG 257, 262 (2001). The U.S. Department of Treasury
also plays an important, although often informal, role. The "Treasury Amend-
ment"-though not explicitly directed at the U.S. Treasury - expressly excludes
certain financial instruments from the scope of federal commodities regulation.
The Treasury Amendment provides that
[n]othing in this chapter shall be deemed to govern or in any way be ap-
plicable to transactions in foreign currency, security warrants, security
rights, resales of installment loan contracts, repurchase options, govern-
ment securities, or mortgages and mortgage purchase commitments,
unless such transactions involve the sale thereof for future delivery con-
ducted on a board of trade.
7 U.S.C. § 2(ii) (1994); see also Net Capital Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,961, 42,963 (Oct. 23,
1985) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (CFTC interpretation of Treasury
Amendment). The Treasury Amendment arguably exempts from regulation cer-
tain types of derivatives, including swaps.
26 There is substantial uncertainty surrounding the definition of "security."
The question of whether a particular financial contact is a "security" (and there-
fore falls within the ambit of federal securities law) typically turns on judicial in-
terpretation of the relevant federal statutes. In the 1933 Securities Act, Congress
defined the term "security" as
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebted-
ness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree-
ment, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscrip-
tion, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
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Securities Exchange Act 28 Second, the Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission ("CFTC") regulates "futures" 29 (which include ex-
change-traded futures on various commodities, instruments, and
indices)30 pursuant to the Commodity Exchange Act 3' Many of the
conflicts in derivatives regulation stem from the turf battle be-
tween the SEC and CFTC created by these two statutory regimes.32
Generally, such a bifurcated regime is problematic. It is in-
creasingly difficult to determine whether, under the applicable
tests, a particular instrument is a "security," a "future," or nei-
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil,
gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege
on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (in-
cluding any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put,
call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities ex-
change relating to foreign currency, or, in general, arty interest or in-
strument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guar-
antee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the fore-
going.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1).
The definition in the 1934 Securities Exchange Act is virtually identical to the
definition in the 1933 Act and courts have held that the 1933 and 1934 Acts cover
the same instruments. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10); see also Reves v. Ernst & Young.
494 U.S. 56 (1990) (holding that demand notes were "securities" under the 1933
and 1934 Securities Acts).
27 15 U.S.C. § 77.
28 Id. § 78c.
29 An additional wrinkle is added by the fact that the CF7C also has exclusive
jurisdiction over option transactions involving commodities. Sce 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(i)
(granting the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over "accounts, agreements (including
any transaction which is of the character of... an 'option' .. .), and transactions
involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or executed
on a contract market... or any other board of trade, exchange, or market...
30 Congress passed the Commodity Exchange Act and amended it to estab-
lish the CFTC in 1974, in response to widespread abuses in commodity futures
trading and to protect investors amid "the volatile and esoteric futures trading
complex." CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 836 (1986) (quoting -LR. REP. No. 93-975,
at I (1974)).
31 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2001).
32 The lines between regulatory areas in the United States often are less than
dear. For example, a "futures contract" may only be traded on a designated ex-
change, but a "forward contract"-even if it is economically equivalent-may be
traded off-exchange or OTC. See Willa E. Gibson, Are Swap Agreenents Securities
or Futures?: The Inadequacies of Applying 11t Traditional Regulatory Apprach to OTC
Derivatives Transactions, 24 J. CORP. L. 379 (1999).
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ther.33 Regulated derivatives may be economically equivalent but
fit under different statutory regimes.34 Competition between these
two regimes has not led to the efficiencies predicted by scholars
who advocate expanded regulatory competition.35 To the contrary,
competition has led to a nasty and inefficient "turf battle" and
costly uncertainty.36
Consider, for example, the regulation of forward contracts on
individual stocks or bonds. The SEC and CFTC have disagreed
about this issue for decades. The SEC claimed that it should have
jurisdiction because such contracts behave like the underlying in-
dividual stocks and bonds; the CFTC claimed it should have juris-
diction because such contracts behave like futures. 37 For such con-
tracts, it was unclear which, if any, regulatory regime applied, and
competition between the two relevant jurisdictions had only in-
33 Consider, for example, an unusual type of derivative instrument called a
"viatical settlement." The purchaser of a viatical settlement pays cash upfront for
an interest in the life insurance policy of a terminally ill person, typically a victim
of AIDS. The price of the viatical settlement is discounted depending on the life
expectancy of the insured. When the insured dies, the investor receives a share of
the insurance proceeds. The courts have struggled with the question of whether
viatical settlements are "securities," ultimately relying on the Howey test, which
holds that an investment contract is a security if investors purchase with an ex-
pectation of profits arising from a common enterprise that depends upon the ef-
forts of others. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). In 1996,
the D.C. Circuit held, over a vigorous dissent by Judge Wald, that viatical settle-
ments were not securities. The reasoning was that although they are purchased
with an expectation of profits arising from a common enterprise, those profits did
not depend upon the "efforts of others," because the intermediaries selling the
contracts performed only ministerial services and, instead, it is the length of the
insured's life that is of overwhelming importance to the value of the viatical set-
tlements. See SEC v. Life Partners Inc., 87 F.3d 536,542-48 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
34 Even relatively straightforward regulatory regimes present complex and
intractable questions. For example, the task of matching purchase and sale trans-
actions for the purpose of calculating liability under Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b), becomes enormously complicated once deriva-
tives are included. See Magma Power Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 136 F.3d 316 (2d Cir.
1998) (finding that Dow Chemical's delivery of Magma Power stock was not eligi-
ble for 16(b) purposes where the stock was delivered pursuant to the exercise of
subordinated exchangeable notes Dow Chemical previously had issued; the notes
gave the noteholder the option to exchange the notes at any time prior to maturity
for a fixed number of Magma Power shares).
35 See Russo & Vinciguerra, supra note 20.
36 Id. at 1434-35.
37 See, e.g., Day, supra note 20, at El (describing turf battles between the SEC
and CFTC since 1982).
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creased uncertainty and paralyzed the markets for those instru-
ments?3 In fact, the only resolution to the dispute was a Congres-
sional ban on futures contracts for individual stocks and bonds;
such contracts became illegal and unenforceable. 39 In other words,
options on single securities were allowed; futures on single securi-
ties were not.40 Efforts to remove the ban provoked heated de-
bate.41 In this area, regulatory competition did not lead to efficient
results; it forced a stalemate.
Over time, exceptions were carved out of this ban against fu-
tures trading of individual stocks and bonds. There were excep-
tions for futures on government securities, including US. Treasury
bonds and futures on broad-based equity indices, including the
Standard & Poor's 500 Index.42 Other "illegal" futures were traded
in the OTC market.43 In other words, regulation banning the trad-
ing of these instruments created a gray market in economically
equivalent OTC derivatives transactions. This gray market was not
trivial. By 2000, the market for equity swaps was several trillion
dollars 44
Finally, on December 15, 2000, Congress passed the Commod-
ity Futures Modernization Act ("CFMA"),45 which lifted the ban on
33 See id.
39 The Commodity Exchange Act provides that it is unlawful to enter into a
commodity futures contract that is not made "on or subject to the rules of a board
of trade ... located outside the United States... unless such transaction is con-
ducted on or subject to the rules of a board of trade which has been designated ...
by the Commission as a contract market... for such commodity." 7 U.S.C. § 6(a)
(2001).
40 See Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. SEC, 187 F.3d 713,716 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting
that "It]his allocation appears to be a political compromise; no one has suggested
an economic rationale for the distinction.").
41 See SEC's Levitt Sees "Gaping Loophole" in Senate Bill 2697, 6 DERIVAn'Es
LMG. REP., July 3,2000, at 9.
42 See Day, supra note 20, at El.
43 The creation of such instruments is another example of regulatory arbi-
trage. See Partnoy, Regulatory Arbitrage, supra note 1, at 227.
44 An Introduction to Risk Managenzent in Corporate Finance, at http://wi-.z.
mellon.com/inst/mcf/derivatives/services.html. In an equity swap, one coun-
terparty agrees to receive (and the other agrees to pay) the increase in value of a
particular stock or stocks and, in exchange, that counterparty agrees to pay (and
the other agrees to receive) a specific periodic payment, typically based on some
fixed or floating interest rate.
45 Commodity Futures Modernization Act, S. 2697, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R.
4541,106th Cong. (2000).
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trading of single-stock futures. Single-stock futures are likely to
begin trading soon on U.S. exchanges. 46 It remains unclear
whether the regulatory structure now governing trading of these
instruments will succeed. In any event, the historical lesson is that
"regulatory competition" froze trading in a major asset class for
two decades and created incentives for parties to engage in deriva-
tive trades that were economically equivalent to those assets.
Market participants also created large classes of OTC deriva-
tives to fill gaps in other CFTC regulation. The CFTC requires that
any CFTC-regulated financial contracts be traded on a CFTC-
regulated exchange,47 and Congress allows the CFTC to create a list
of forward contracts that could be excluded entirely from CFTC
regulation (and that therefore were not required to be traded on a
CFTC-regulated exchange). Today, such forward contracts are
traded in the OTC market and include some of the largest markets
in the world, such as the market for interest rate and currency
swaps.
Derivatives traded in these OTC markets would remain legal
so long as the CFTC keeps those trades on its list of exempt con-
tracts. However, there was the possibility, albeit unlikely, that the
CFTC would remove one or more contracts from its list. If the
CFTC did so, such contracts would become illegal and unenforce-
able, because they would not be traded on a CFTC-regulated ex-
change.48 This remote possibility contributed to the uncertainty
among derivatives market participants.
46 It was anticipated that trading would be authorized among investors in the
U.S. by late 2001. See Joseph Weber, Caution: Single-Stock Futures Ahead, Bus. WK.,
Feb. 26, 2001, at 38. Congress passed the CFMA just hours before adjourning for
the session, with no comment or debate. Prior hearings on the CFMA had not ad-
dressed many important policy issues, and the last-minute approval of the bill
during the controversy surrounding the Presidential election precluded any fur-
ther considerations of policy. See Frank Partnoy, Stock Gambling on the Cheap, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2000, at A39. The CFMA also exempted swaps from regulation,
thereby cementing some long-standing attempts by financial market participants
to insulate a large portion of the derivatives market from regulation.
47 See 7 U.S.C. § 6(a)-6(c) (2001).
48 In the example of equity swaps, which were created to sidestep the ban of
forward contracts on individual stocks and bonds, the legal uncertainty was espe-
cially great See, e.g., Day, supra note 20, at El ("If equity swaps were deemed by a
court to be futures contracts, they would become instantly illegal, on or off a
regulated exchange, because of the ban on futures contracts based on individual
corporate securities.").
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The statutory uncertainty of OTC derivatives regulation has a
complex history. During the 1980s, as derivatives were develop-
ing,49 regulators struggled with possible responses to the differen-
tial jurisdictional treatment of derivatives.50 In 1984, the CFTC and
the SEC issued a Joint Policy Statement spelling out the types of fi-
nancial derivatives the agencies believed were suitable for trad-
ing.5 Following that statement, the CFTC issued several releases
addressing the issue and responded on a case-by-case basis to in-
quiries about regulation of particular instruments through its no-
action letter process 52 The primary focus of the releases and re-
sponses was on the market for swaps,5 which had been growing
dramatically in the late 1980s. In response to a perceived need for
clarification, the CFTC issued a detailed policy statement on swaps
on July 21,1989.54
The 1989 CFTC policy statement took the position that most
swap transactions were not appropriately regulated by the CFTC
49 Even by 1989, there was $7.1 trillion worth of outstanding notional amount
of derivative financial instruments. HiAMILTON ET AL, supra note 23, at 9. By June
1999, the estimated global notional amount was $31.5 trillion. Sce Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements Releases Global Derivatives Statistics, 5 DERvATIVEs LITIG. REP.,
Dec. 20,1999, at 6.
S0 Courts struggled too, which often resulted in contradictory holdings. For
example, in 1984, the Seventh Circuit held that a forward contract to purchase a
Government National Mortgage Associate security was properly regulated by the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws, even though the forward contract itself
is not a security as defined by the securities laws. See Abrams v. Oppenheimer
Gov't Sec., Inc., 737 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1984).
See CFTC & SEC Designation Criteria for Futures Contracts and Options on
Futures Contracts Involving Non-Diversified Stock Indexes of Domestic Issues, 49
Fed. Reg. 2884 Gan. 24, 1984). Although this statement was simply a statement,
not a regulation, and therefore lacked legal force, market participants observed its
limits for many years when proposing new contracts. See Bd. of Trade of Chicago
v. SEC, 187 F.3d 713,716-17 (7th Cir. 1999).
52 See CFTC Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg.
30,694, 30,694 n.2 (July 21, 1989) [hereinafter CFTC Policy Statement] (describing
relevant proposed rules, requests for comments, and notices of proposed rule-
making from 1985 through 1989); see also id. at 30,694 n.3 (describing several no-
action letters addressing proposed offerings of derivative transactions by the
CFTC Task Force on Off-Exchange Instruments).
53 A swap is simply a contract pursuant to which two counterparties agree to
exchange cash flows. In an interest rate swap, the counterparties exchange cash
flows based on changes in some interest rate or interest rate index; in a currency
swap, they exchange cash flows based on changes in some foreign exchange rate
or index.
54 See id. at 30,694.
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and recognized "a non-exclusive safe harbor for transactions satis-
fying the requirements set forth herein."55  The CFTC relied on
multiple rationales for exempting swaps from regulation 6 but rec-
ognized the argument that swaps are economically equivalent to
futures.57
The CFTC policy statement listed five specific criteria relevant
to determining whether the safe harbor applied. The CFTC's
stated objective in issuing the policy statement was to generate "a
greater degree of clarity" 8 for swap market participants. These
criteria are: (1) individually tailored terms; (2) absence of ex-
change-style offset; (3) absence of clearing organization or margin
system; (4) the transaction is undertaken in conjunction with a line
of business; and (5) prohibition against marketing to the public.5 9
The criteria are examined in detail below.
From 1989 until early 1993, the derivatives industry lobbied the
CFTC to adopt regulations embodying the principles and objec-
tives in the 1989 policy statement. 0 At the eleventh hour, one
week before the end of her term, CFTC Chair Wendy Gramm-
wife of Senator Phil Gramm-finally persuaded the CFTC to adopt
the exemption (in what was described as Gramnm's "farewell gift"
55 Id.
56 The CFrC stated:
Commenters have described the swap market as one in which the cus-
tomary large transaction size effectively limits the market to institutional
participants rather than the retail public. Market participants also have
noted that swaps typically involve long-term contracts, with maturities
ranging up to twelve years. In addition to these characteristics, many
comparisons between swaps and futures contracts have stressed the tai-
lored, non-standardized nature of swap terms; the necessity for particu-
larized credit determinations in connection with each swap transaction
(or series of transactions between the same counterparties); the lack of
public participation in the swap markets; and the predominantly institu-
tional and commercial nature of swap participants.
Id. at 30,695 (citations omitted).
57 "Other commenters have stressed that despite these distinctions in the
manner of trading of swaps and exchange products, the economic reality of swaps
nevertheless resembles that of futures contracts." Id. Economically, swaps can be
described as a series of forward contracts.
58 Id. at 30,696.
59 Id. at 30,696-97.
60 See Matt Rees, Swap Market: Farewell Giftfrom CFTC's Gramm for Swap Trad-
ers, BLOOMBERG Bus. NEws, Jan. 14,1993, at 1 (on file with author).
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the swaps industry61) in 17 C.F.R. § 35, known as Part 35. Part 35 is
a framework for exempting particular OTC swaps from the CEA's
exchange trading requirements. Part 35 exempts swaps that meet
particular categories 2 and authorizes the CFTC to grant additional
exemptions on a case-by-case basis.63
Part 35 did not provide nearly the certainty it could have.6
Part 35.1(b)(1)(i)-(ii) explicitly exempted certain swap agreements,
including any agreement which was
a rate swap agreement, basis swap, forward rate agreement,
commodity swap, interest rate option, forward foreign ex-
change agreement, rate cap agreement, rate floor agree-
ment, rate collar agreement, currency swap agreement,
cross-currency rate swap agreement, currency option, any
other similar agreement (including any option to enter into
any of the foregoing) ... [or] any combination of the fore-
going.65
In late 2000, Congress passed the CFMA, which-in addition to
legalizing single-stock futures-clarified the swaps exemption. As
with single-stock futures, the regulatory response was slow, and
during the interim period before the CFMA derivatives markets
participants were subject to regulatory uncertainty. The CFMA
was passed with little substantive debate, and it is useful to recon-
sider the historical bases for the swaps exemption. In particular,
although Congress did not explicitly consider the previously ar-
ticulated 1989 CFTC policy statement, that statement offers a great
deal of wisdom and perspective.
However, these particular terms were not defined, and it was
unclear what tests should be applied to determine if a particular
instrument fit within the list. Part 35.1(b)(2) limited eligible swap
participants to: (1) financial institutions, including banks, trust
61 Id.
62 These categories include minimum financial thresholds for various institu-
tions. See Exemption of Swap Agreements, 17 C.F.R. § 35.1(b)(2) (2001).
63 See id. § 35.2.
64 See Rees, supra note 60, at 2 (quoting a prominent derivatives attorney as
saying "it's not a completely clean exemption").
65 17 C.F.R. § 35.1(b)(1)(i)-(ii).
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companies, savings associations, credit unions, insurance compa-
nies, investment companies, commodity pools, broker-dealers, and
futures commission merchants (including floor brokers or floor
traders);66 (2) large corporations, including business entities with
total assets in excess of $10 million or a net worth of $1 million if it
is entering into the swap in connection with its business or if the
swap obligations are secured;6 7 (3) employee benefit plans, in-
cluding both certain employee benefit plans subject to the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and certain foreign
persons performing similar functions;68 and (4) governmental enti-
ties, including the United States, states, foreign governments, mul-
tinational entities, and their political subdivisions.69 These provi-
sions were dear, but static, and were neither indexed to inflation
nor flexible enough to allow additions or subtractions from the list
based on changes over time. In the seven years after Part 35 was
enacted, it did not change at all; during the same time, the deriva-
tives industry experienced revolutionary change.
Although derivatives industry participants have relied on the
safe harbor of the CFTC policy statement since 1989, and Part 35
since 1993, they do not appear to have considered in detail the ap-
plication of the factors in either case. Indeed, because Part 35 was
ambiguous in several respects,70 it is useful to consider the factors
in the 1989 CFTC policy statement in greater detail. For many
swaps at least one of the criteria-often several-were not satis-
fied. Moreover, the 1989 CFTC policy statement is a very useful
statement of the intended coverage of any swaps exemption. The
1989 criteria have been among the most important, yet least dis-
cussed, aspects of U.S. derivatives regulation. Legal commentators
have largely ignored them. Therefore, it is worth considering these
criteria in greater detail.
66 See id. § 35.1(b)(2)(i)-(v), (ix), (x).
67 See id. § 35.1(b)(2)(vi).
68 See id. § 35.1(b)(2)(vii).
69 See id. § 35.1(b)(2)(viii) (2001).
70 For example, Part 35 does not include as exempt any swaps that are part of
a "fungible class of agreements that are standardized as to their material economic
terms." 17 C.F.R. § 35.2(b) (1993). This language, while ambiguous, draws heav-
ily from all five criteria in the 1989 CFTC policy statement. See CFrC Policy
Statement, supra note 52.
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The first criterion is individually tailored terms, which rela-
tively few swaps have. The CFTC stated, "[s]uch tailoring and
counterparty credit assessment distinguish swap transactions from
exchange transactions, where the contract terms are standardized
and the counterparty is unknown."71 The assumption that swaps
were individually tailored may have been true in 1989; it certainly
no longer holds true today. Most swap agreements are fully stan-
dardized. The International Swap Dealers Association ("ISDA")
has established a detailed standardized contract that is used for the
vast majority of swap contracts. Interest rate swaps and currency
swaps in particular are highly standardized. In the 1989 policy
statement, the CFTC recognized that swap counterparties entering
into several swap transactions might find it beneficial to enter into
a "master agreement" covering all of the transactions, although it
warned that it nevertheless required that "material terms of the
master agreement and transaction specifications are individually
tailored by the parties."72 The market has moved away from the
CFTC's expressed understanding in 1989. According to the CFTC,
"[t]o qualify for safe harbor treatment, swaps must be negotiated
by the parties as to their material terms, based upon individualized
credit determinations, and documented by the parties in an agree-
ment or series of agreements that is not fully standardized."73 By
this standard, many swaps-including many disputed swaps-
would not qualify.
Second, in order to qualify for a safe harbor, the CFTC required
that a swap not have an "exchange-style offset"74 This term refers
to the ability of a party to liquidate a futures position by acquiring
an opposite, or off-setting, position.' For exchange traded futures,
because the counterparty to any trade is the exchange and there is
a single clearing organization for any trade, there is no need to ob-
tain the consent of the clearing organization in order to offset fu-
tures transactions. The CFTC seemed to believe in 1989 that there
was a substantive difference between futures and swap transac-
tions, because the counterparty to a swap is another party whose
71 CFTC Policy Statement, supra note 52, at 30,696.
72 Id. at 30,696 n.17
7 Id. at 30,696.
74 Id.
Id.
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consent was required in order to offset the swap.76 The purpose of
this requirement, as articulated by the CFTC, was to exempt only
transactions that "are not readily used as trading vehicles, that are
entered into with the expectation of performance and that are ter-
minated as well as entered into based upon private negotiation."77
This is a distinction without a difference. Parties enter into off-
setting swaps quite commonly. Counterparties routinely net
swaps, and it may be possible-though frequently it is very
costly-to find several counterparties (other than the original
counterparty to a swap) to enter into a mirror to the original swap.
Legal rules, including tax and net capital requirements, explicitly
recognize netting and private parties net swaps in assessing credit
exposure to various counterparties. Moreover, some swaps are
quite liquid and fungible and are traded using broker screens in a
way that is virtually indistinguishable from exchange trades.
There have been proposals to trade swaps on exchanges, and one
commentator believes exchange trading is a natural solution to
some of the problems posed by OTC derivatives. 78 At least one
website has proposed acting as an intermediary for swap transac-
tions.79 Thus, since 1989, the swaps market has changed in ways
that conflict with the CFTC's understanding of this second crite-
rion.
The third safe harbor criterion is that swaps should not have a
clearing organization or margin system. The CFTC clearly did not
intend to exempt swaps for which there was a clearing organiza-
tion or some similar system used to minimize credit risk. Accord-
ing to the CFTC, "this safe harbor is applicable only to swap trans-
actions that are not supported by the credit of a clearing
organization and that are not primarily or routinely supported by a
market-to-market margin and variation settlement system de-
signed to eliminate individualized credit risk."80
As noted above, private parties act in ways (e.g., netting) that
make the swaps market very similar in economic substance to the
futures market. Banks mark their positions to market values at
76 CFTC Policy Statement, supra note 52, at 30,696.
77 Id.
78 See STEINHERR, supra note 1, at xiv.
79 See myCFO, Homepage, at http://www.mycfo.com/ (last visited Oct. 26,
2001).
80 CFTC Policy Statement, supra note 52, at 30,696.
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least daily, and monitor certain positions more frequently. There
are a few banks with large numbers of counterparties that are at
least as sophisticated as the futures exchanges in reducing credit
risk. There are various risk management systems available, in-
cluding well known approaches such as CreditMetrics and Value-
at-Risk. There even have been efforts to securitize or insure de-
rivatives exposure to offload credit risk.% In short, the swaps mar-
ket has developed private risk management systems that resemble
the credit, clearing, and margin systems of exchange markets.
Fourth, to qualify for the safe harbor, swap transactions should
be undertaken in conjunction with a line of business. It is unclear
how far the CFTC originally envisioned the "line of business" test
would extend, but it noted that "[siwap transactions entered into
with respect to exchange rate, interest rate, or other price exposure
arising from a participant's line of business or the financing of its
business would be consistent with this standard."82
This statement appears to draw a distinction between dealer
transactions and transactions by non-dealer or non-financial par-
ties. Transactions between banks in the OTC market-the vast
majority of OTC derivatives-may be related to "line of business"
exposure, although frequently they will involve speculation or ar-
bitrage instead. But more importantly, transactions involving non-
bank parties, which are more frequently disputed than bank-to-
bank transactions, often will not relate to a line of business at all83
Fifth, swap transactions may not be marketed to the publicP
This criteria merits only a short paragraph in the CFTC policy
81 For example, the London Clearing House, the clearing house for London's
main derivatives exchanges, bought £150 million in credit insurance from a sub-
sidiary of American International Group. See Sophie Belcher, London Clearing
House Buys GBP100 Million in Credit Protection, DEmVATIVES Wv., Feb. 10, 1997, at
1. This insurance protects the clearing house from credit losses of more than this
amount during a three-year period. Other exchanges have purchased similar
forms of default insurance.
82 See CFTC Policy Statement, supra note 52, at 30,697 n.23.
83 Consider, for example, the payments Gibson Greetings was to owe on a
swap transaction it entered into with Bankers Trust in October 1992- Gibson's
payments would equal 5.5% minus LUBOR-squared divided by 6%. This swap,
known as a "ratio swap," could not possibly have been related to any Gibson line
of business. Arguably, a swap with a squared term cannot be related to any en-
tity's line of business, at least on this planet The CFTC policy statement should
not cover transactions like ratio swaps, which are unrelated to a line of business.
84 See CFTC Policy Statement, supra note 52, at 30,697.
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statement, although that paragraph makes it clear that the CFTC
assumed swaps would not be part of a banks core sales function.
This assumption also proved incorrect. Swap dealers aggressively
market their transactions to clients outside the financial sector, and
the greatest profits from swaps involve sales to public investors
(individuals and institutions) who may lack the sophistication and
information necessary to evaluate the transactions.
This movement away from the CFTC's original understanding
of swaps generated great uncertainty about the regulation of OTC
derivatives. Obviously, swap dealers understood the implications
of this uncertainty and therefore lobbied for clearer exemptions.85
Regulators resisted this lobbying, in part because they understood
how OTC dealers lobbied previously for the 1993 exemptions in
Part 35 and then expanded it to support a multi-trillion dollar un-
regulated industry.
For all these reasons, the legal rights of the parties to any dis-
pute stemming from losses on OTC derivatives have been mired in
uncertainty. The CTMA ameliorates some of the concerns of both
industry executives and federal regulators that a counterparty
might walk away from its obligations under an OTC derivatives
contract and successfully argue that the contract was illegal and
therefore unenforceable. 86 In late 1998, such uncertainty had gen-
erated fear among regulators that the collapse of Long-Term
Capital Management, which had relied heavily on OTC derivatives
contracts, would cause securities markets to unravel.87 More re-
cently, uncertainty has stifled innovation and contracting in the de-
rivatives markets.
In a recent article, Michael Bennett and Michael Matin argue
that some regulators use legal uncertainty and ambiguity to en-
hance and maintain their control over derivatives market partici-
pants.88 Regulators in Asia often overlook or ignore questionable
85 See sources cited supra note 20.
86 See, e.g., Day, supra note 20, at E4 ("The legal status of OTC derivatives is
murky. The enforceability of these contracts has never been tested in court.
Regulators and industry executives hope it stays that way until Congress clears
up the laws governing these complex, increasingly essential financial products.").
87 See id.
88 Bennett & Matin, supra note 13, at 9 (describing the regulatory model for
such legal uncertainty as the "Casablanca Paradigm," named for the 1942 Warner
Brothers movie).
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market practices until political pressures force them to act.s9 This
approach creates uncertainty for market participants, "because it
limits the importance of regulatory precedent."g In Asia, regula-
tors provide guidance to market participants on an informal basis,
through the administrative approach known as gyousei shidou, cre-
ating burdens for firms that do not comply with the regulators and
awarding benefits to firms that do.91
This informal process has benefits, especially in terms of cost
However, market participants do not have advance warning of a
change in position. If the market participants have a close relation-
ship with the regulators, it may lead to greater flexibility and per-
haps greater certainty in the short term. It is difficult to obtain reli-
able information about derivatives losses, so it is difficult to say
how such losses result in disputes.92
The regulators' positions with respect to statutory coverage of
derivatives are in constant flux. In derivatives markets outside the
United States, there is even greater uncertainty, because market
participants believe regulators might change their approach to de-
rivatives at any time.93 But even in the United States, there has not
been a consistent regulatory position. For example, on November
9, 1999, the President's Working Group on Financial Markets94 is-
sued a report recommending additional deregulation and exemp-
69 See CHARLES ADAMS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MAR Krs 4 (1993); An-
tony Currie, Asian Derivatives: Waiting for the Big One, EUROMONEY, Feb. 15 1997, at
82.
90 Bennett & Main, supra note 13, at 10.
91 See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Managing the Market: T7 Ministry of Finance and Se-
curities Regulation in Japan, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 423 (1994); see also Bennett & Matin,
supra note 13, at 11 n.43 (citing numerous sources).
92 See Robert W. McSherry, Experts Worry Over te Potential for Derivatives De-
faults by Asian Companies, DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP., Feb. 5, 1993, at 3 ("Insider re-
ports, however, are hard to verify because of a culture of reticence that permeates
the derivatives business.").
93 "The fact that regulators have tolerated a practice in the past does not nec-
essarily mean that the practice will continue to be tolerated in the future or that
market participants will be given any warning before the regulators change their
position." Bennett & Marin, supra note 13, at 10-11.
94 The President's Working Group on Financial Markets consists of the Sec-
retary of the Treasury, and the chairpersons of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and the Federal Reserve
Board. See Conrad G. Bahlke, A Brief Review of the President's Working Group Issues
Report on OTC Derivatives, SEc. LITIG. & REG. REP., Dec. 22,1999, at 10.
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tions for OTC derivatives.95 At approximately the same time, two
members of Congress cosponsored a bill making equity swaps, a
commonly used type of OTC derivative, subject to regulation.
96
Although the CFMA passed at the eleventh hour, it faced intense
opposition.97
Finally, the statutory uncertainty about derivatives is not lim-
ited to federal laws. Certain state laws have also generated uncer-
tainty. In particular, there is uncertainty surrounding state laws
prohibiting certain forms of gambling. There are such statutes in
most U.S. states98 and foreign jurisdictions,99 and although there
are few, if any, recent cases decided under those statutes, their lan-
guage is broad enough to encompass billions of dollars of deriva-
95 The President's Working Group Report warned that the uncertain status of
some derivatives could, if not addressed, discourage innovation and growth in
derivatives markets, and recommended, among other things, an exclusion from
the Commodity Exchange Act for sophisticated counterparties to OTC transac-
tions. See id.
96 In early November 1999, Rep. Edward J. Markey and Sen. Byron L. Dorgan
cosponsored the Derivatives Market Reform Act, which would have made equity
swaps subject to regulation under the Securities Exchange Act. Id.
97 See Senate Bill 2697, supra note 41, at 9.
98 For example, under New York law, a transaction is illegal gambling if it is
a "wagero, betf or staked made to depend upon any... chance, casualty or un-
known or contingent event whatever..." N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-401 (McKin-
ney 1989). Similarly, New York's criminal statute states that "[a] person engages
in gambling when he stakes or risks something of value upon.., a future contin-
gent event not under his control or influence, upon an agreement or understand-
ing that he will receive something of value in the event of a certain outcome."
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00 (McKinney 1989).
99 For example, most Asian countries have anti-gambling statutes. In Asia, a
cash settled transaction (as opposed to a physically settled transaction) is more
likely to be deemed an illegal gambling contract. See Bennett & Marin, supra note
13, at 41. For example, courts in Taiwan have found that cash settled derivatives
transactions constitute gambling. Id. (basing such a conclusion on advice received
from the Taipei law firm of Lee and Li). Under the Philippine Civil Code, cash-
settled OTC equity options and forward contracts are likely to be held null and
void as illegal gaming contracts. Id. (basing such a conclusion on advice received
from the Manila law firm of SyCip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan). In a cash
settled transaction, the underlying asset never changes hands; the parties simply
exchange cash at the end of the contract. For example, if a party contracts to buy
gold on a forward basis, at the expiration of a physically settled contract, she
would pay cash and receive the gold; at the expiration of a cash settled contract,
she would pay or receive the difference between the value of the gold and the
value of the cash. See Zvi BODIE & ROBERT C. MERTON, FINANCE 366-68 (2000).
Cash settled transactions are less costly and more convenient, especially for par-
ties who do not actually require delivery of physical assets.
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tives transactions.100 Not surprisingly, derivatives purchasers have
seized on this broad language claiming that the applicable transac-
tions were illegal under the anti-gambling laws of various jurisdic-
tions.ira To the extent particular OTC derivatives are not covered
by the swaps exemption, this argument is a serious one.
Several legal scholars have argued that many financial deriva-
tives can be considered as gambling, and the line between legiti-
mate transactions and gambling is less than clear 2 New rules
promulgated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board attempt
to draw the line between hedging and speculation in the deriva-
tives context, with results that are both complex and often coun-
terintuitive 3 Many recently issued securities easily could be
categorized as illegal gambling contracts including, for example: a
bond linked to the number of victories by the Utah Jazz, a profes-
sional basketball team; 04 a derivative security based on an interest
rate index multiplied by itself three times;10 or so-called Asian op-
100 Many such statutes are both vague and broad, especially outside the
United States. For example, the Indonesian Civil Code provides simply that all
claims arising from games or betting are unenforceable; Hong Kong's Gambling
Ordinance prohibits gaming, betting, and bookmaking and defines gaming as the
playing of any game for winnings in money or other property. See Bennett & Ma-
rin, supra note 13, at 39-40 n.166; see also Gillian Tett, Traders Gamble on an Anomaly,
FIN. TIMES (London), July 17,1998, at 6 (discussing applicability of Japanese anti-
gambling laws to financial derivatives).
101 See, e.g., Korea Life Files 2nd Amended Complaint Against Morgan Guaranty, 6
DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP., July 3, 2000, at 3 (noting claims raised under New York
gambling statute).
102 See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?
- Derivative Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on tw Underlying Capital
Markets, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 987 (1992); Lynn A. Stout, iAhy lte Law Hates Specula-
tors: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE UJ.
701 (1999). Legislators also have made this point. Se STEINHER, supra note 1, at
151 (citing Rep. Henry Gonzalez as saying, "You can call it [the use of derivatives]
whatever you want, but in my book it's gambling.").
103 FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD STATEMNT OF FINANCIAL
CONCEPTS No. 113; see also Michael S. Lesak, Comment, FASB's Folly: A Look at thw
Misguided New Rules on Derivatives Valuation and Disclosure, 29 LoY. U. CM. LJ. 649
(1998).
104 See JOHN EATWELL & LANCE TAYLOR, GLOBAL FINANCE AT RISK: THE CASE
FOR INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 101 (2000). I am grateful to Peter H. Huang for
pointing out this example.
105 See FRANK PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O.: THE INSIDE STORY OF A WALL STREET
TRADER 139-40 (1999).
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tions, whose payoff can depend on a continuously sampled geo-
metric average.106
Several states also have so-called "bucket shop" laws107 which
present a similar problem to those posed by the anti-gambling
statutes. Bucket shop laws prohibit wagering on changes in the
market prices of securities by means of "fictitious transactions in
such securities." 08 One court has held that an interest rate swap
was not subject to California's bucket shop law.109 However, it is
questionable whether the analysis in that case would prevent most
derivatives from falling under the law.110
In sum, statutes regulating derivatives are all over the financial
map. They provide little clarity or certainty to market participants
who have attempted to opt out of these statutes by structuring
transactions outside their reach. For some parties involved in de-
rivatives disputes, it is unclear if the statutes apply at all.
3.2. Judicial Treatment of Derivatives Disputes
The above discussion of the statutory coverage of derivatives
shows how difficult it can be to determine whether a particular de-
rivative is a regulated security, a regulated commodity, or is un-
106 See WILMOTr, supra note 9, at 215-26.
107 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 29000-29201 (West 1977 & Supp. 2001).
108 In re Thrifty Oil Co., 212 B.R. 147, 153 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Cali-
fornia statutes).
109 Id. at 154.
110 First, that court noted that the interest rate swap did not involve a security
or commodity, as California's law requires. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 29004 (West
1977) (defining security as "all shares in any corporation or association.., and
other evidences of debt or property and options for the purchase or sale thereof or
any rights entitling the holder thereof to participate in profits or a division of as-
sets"); id. § 29005 (West 1977) (defining commodity as "anything movable that is
bought and sold"). Even if it were the case that the payments on a fixed-for-
floating interest rate swap did not involve a security or commodity according to
the statutory definition, many other derivatives would involve a security or com-
modity. Second, the court noted that the bucket shop statute only covers agree-
ments where neither party intends to deliver the security or commodity. See id. §
29008 (West 1977). The court apparently misunderstood the meaning of this sec-
tion of the statute as requiring that one or both of the parties not intend to fulfill
its part of the contract "[The parties] fully intended to perform their payment ob-
ligations under the swaps-there was no fictitious transaction." In re Thrifty Oil
Co., 212 B.R. at 154.
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regulated."' This determination is crucial in a dispute about losses
stemming from an investment in derivatives. If a judge determines
that the derivatives subject to dispute were securities or commodi-
ties, then a federal regulatory regime would apply to the resolution
of the dispute;" 2 if not, the judge would dismiss the federal claims
and any state law claims would remain.
In some cases, judges and regulators have strained to argue
that particular OTC derivatives were governed by securities or
commodities laws." 3 However, in most of the relevant cases, as
the parties intended, the derivatives are governed by neither, and
the judges are left to resolve state law claims predominantly under
common law." 4 The problem presented here thus relates to the
resolution of disputes when there is no applicable federal statutory
law. In these cases, the parties are seeking to resolve disputes
based on common law and analogical reasoning. Derivatives com-
plaints in such cases have alleged breach of fiduciary duty, com-
mon law fraud and negligent misrepresentation, lack of authority,
and various contract-based claims." 5
111 For example, a court would resolve a dispute concerning an investment in
a "security." See supra note 26 which defines "security" as used in the 1933 and
1934 Acts, under the applicable federal securities laws (most likely under Rule
10b-5), regardless of whether the economic qualities of the instrument make it a
"derivative." Similarly, a court would resolve a dispute concerning a commodity
under the relevant federal law. Such disputes involving "regulated" derivatives
do not present the same serious difficulties posed in disputes involving OTC de-
rivatives.
112 In disputes about derivative securities or commodities, a court will rule that
a particular statute applies and then the parties will go about litigating under the
terms of that statute. The parties may be uncertain whether the statutory regime
applies to their contract. This problem is addressed in Section 4.2.1 and is not of
additional concern for purposes of this Section.
11 See, e.g., In re BT Secs. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 35,136, [1994-1995
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,477, at 86,114 (Dec. 22, 1994) (as-
suming that Bankers Trust violated the securities and commodities laws without
finding explicitly that the interest rate swaps Bankers Trust sold were securities or
commodities).
114 These claims also may include state statute-based claims. See supra notes
98-106 and accompanying text (describing anti-gambling statutes in New York
and Asia and relevant derivatives). For a description of some of the common law
arguments by practitioners in derivatives cases through 1997, see Aaron Rubin-
stein, Derivatives and Risk Management: Common Law T7hcories of Liability in Deriv2-
fives Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 737 (1997).
115 See, e.g., Joanne Medero et aL, Investing in Derivatives: Current Litigation Is-
sues, 8 INSIGHTS 4 (Nov. 1994) (noting that complaints include "claims for common
law fraud, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty"
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In this Section, I analyze how courts in some representative
cases have treated these various state common law claims. The
drawbacks of common law in this area are enormous. It is extraor-
dinarily expensive to resolve these disputes, and there are few
published decisions to guide future parties. Facts are difficult to
ascertain. Complaints often do not describe the underlying trans-
actions accurately" 6 and neither do the paltry number of judicial
opinions. Jurisdictional battles are fierce and costly." 7 Documents
as well as claims under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, sections 11
and 12(2) of the Securities Act, and various sections of the Investment Company
Act). Another potential ground for recovery is commercial frustration or imprac-
ticability, based on unanticipated changes in one or more of the instrument or in-
dices underlying a particular derivatives contract. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am.
v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 70-78 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (stating that the pur-
pose of contract based on wholesale price index was commercially frustrated by
unexpected increases in the price of oil).
116 The parties and their lawyers may not completely understand the trans-
actions. See, e.g., STEINHERR, supra note 1, at 78 ("OTC products can be complex
enough to raise questions about how well understood they are even by experi-
enced corporate treasurers. There is an associated uncertainty about the value of
complex products for which there is no market.").
117 For example, Judge Feikens held in Procter & Gamble v. Bankers Trust that
because the parties agreed to be bound by New York statutes and case law, there
was no claim under Ohio statutes and therefore dismissed such claims. See Proc-
ter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1289 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
This ruling was not particularly controversial, although it shows that federal
judges are willing to defer to private choice of law provisions, even when one
party may have violated the law of that court's jurisdiction. Note that this defer-
ence would be critical to the survival of a synthetic common law regime. Al-
though federal courts would retain limited judicial review of synthetic common
law dispute resolution, courts would need to show deference to private parties'
choice of regime, even if one party acted contrary to federal or state law.
Several derivatives cases have presented difficult jurisdictional issues. When
Societe Nationale d'Exploitation Industrielle des Tabacs ("SEITA"), the French
national tobacco company, filed suit against Salomon Brothers International Lim-
ited, the London arm of a U.S. investment bank, in the Southern District of New
York, Judge Sweet dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, be-
cause the alleged fraudulent representations were made in London and "[a]s a
French corporation headquartered in Paris, SEITA relied on the alleged misrepre-
sentations, executed the Swaps, and realized its losses in Paris." Societe Nationale
d'Exploitation Industrielle des Tabacs et Allumettes v. Salomon Bros. Int'l Ltd.,
928 F. Supp. 398, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). SEITA subsequently sued in New York Su-
preme Court. I served as a consultant to SEITA during a portion of the litigation.
In a more recent case, Merrill Lynch International moved to dismiss a complaint
by Slovnaft A.S., the former Slovak national oil company, on grounds offorum non
conveniens, claiming the parties had no New York interests and had agreed to re-
solve any disputes in English courts. See Merrill Lynch Seeks Dismissal of $75 Mil-
lion Slovnaft Derivatives Suit, 5 BANK & LENDER LIAB. LITIG. REP., Jan. 19, 2000, at 10.
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are not available, or are under seal. Many important pieces of evi-
dence are destroyed or are otherwise unavailable by the time dis-
covery begins." 8 The result is an expensive, inefficient, unfair, and
uncertain process.
If Oliver Wendell Holmes were alive today, he surely would
want to decide- or at least to write about- disputes involving the
multi-trillion dollar market for OTC financial derivatives."19
Holmes was interested in the major conflicts of his day, in the in-
fluences of technology and scientific progress, and-as he often is
quoted-in experience over logic.'20 To a judge such as Holmes,
the temptations of derivatives disputes would be overwhelming-
When PT Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera, an Indonesian financial services company,
sued Bankers Trust, arguing it was not obligated to pay for losses on a complex
derivative because it had not fully understood the transaction, an Indonesian
court ruled in favor of Dharmala, but the case was transferred to a British court,
which ruled that Dharmala was capable of understanding the risks involved in
the transaction- See Bankers Trust Int'l PLC v. PT Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera, (un-
reported Q.B. (Comm. Ct.) 1 Dec. 1995). The parties later settled the dispute.
Chase Manhattan Bank recently moved to dismiss on the basis of forum non con-
veniens two complaints filed in the Southern District of New York by two Liberian
companies acting on behalf of Greek individuals, arguing that New York was an
inconvenient forum because witnesses and documents are in Europe, and that the
parties chose English law to govern their investments. See Briefs Submitted on Mo-
tion to Dismiss Suit Against Chase Manhattan, 6 DFRIvATas LITIG. REP., July 3,2000,
at 5, 7. The suit and motion obviously were motivated by the availability in the
US. of punitive damages and liberal discovery.
118 For example, tape recordings of incriminating conversations were of criti-
cal importance in the litigation against Bankers Trust. See BT Secs. Corp., supra
note 113, at 86,114; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some
Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Cus-
tomers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 627, 627-28 (1996) (quoting a recorded comment by a BT
Securities employee). However, banks have learned from Bankers Trust's mis-
takes and now either do not record conversations or set up systems to erase or de-
stroy the tapes within a relatively short period of time as a routine business prac-
tice. In one recent case, the plaintiffs requested additional depositions because the
defendant bank allegedly had erased tape recordings related to the relevant swap
transactions. See Seita Claims SBIL Destroyed Tapes; 'Nonsense," Solomon Says,
DERiVATVwES LrTG. REP., May 7,1998, at 9.
119 Financial derivatives are financial instruments whose value is based on, or
derived from, some other underlying instrument or index. See Partnoy, Regulatory
Arbitrage, supra note 1, at 216-26 (describing classes and uses of derivatives). As of
year-end 1999, the size of the derivatives market was estimated at more than S100
trillion. See Seita Claims, supra note 118. Over-the-counter financial derivatives are
those not traded on any exchange.
120 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMZMON LAW 1 (Little, Brown, and Co.
1909) (1881).
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hard-fought, novel claims involving leaders of industry and bil-
lions of dollars; breathtaking innovation and complexity underly-
ing the relationships of the parties; and, above all, the kind of logic-
defying real-world experience that Holmes believed defined the
substance of the law.12' Most importantly, the jurisprudence of de-
rivatives disputes is a tabula rasa available for a bold, intelligent ju-
rist to make his or her mark.
Unfortunately, the judges thus far presented with OTC deriva-
tives claims have, to put it charitably, not been of Holmes's stature.
Judges have shied from deciding any core issues in these cases, ei-
ther because they fear the effects of an off-the-mark precedent or
because they are overwhelmed by the detail and complexity of the
cases. Although the OTC derivatives market is among the largest
markets in the world and is chock full of disputes, judges only
rarely have decided even narrow issues in derivatives disputes,
and they almost never write detailed opinions.122 The vast majority
of cases settle before trial in most areas of law, but the derivatives
area is striking for the near total absence of judicial opinions and
decided cases on important issues. Only one derivatives claim
ever has been tried, 23 and that trial was a decade ago, well before
the recent waves of derivatives disputes. Only a handful of dis-
putes have led to judicial opinions on dispositive motions.
The trepidation of a judge facing a derivatives dispute is un-
derstandable. The financial instruments underlying the disputes
are complex, and the relationships among parties and transactions
are difficult to understand.124 Some judges might find unraveling
121 Holmes's attempt to present "a general view of the Common Law" recog-
nized the importance of both history and current practice: "The substance of the
law at any given time pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is
then understood to be convenient; but its form and machinery, and the degree to
which it is able to work out desired results, depend very much upon its past." Id.
at 1-2.
122 A rare exception is the opinion by Judge Feikens in Procter & Gamble, 925
F. Supp. at 1270, which considered multiple claims in detail. Ironically, Judge
Feikens, in Ohio, was interpreting New York state law, and the New York state
courts subsequently have rejected a portion of his opinion with little analytical
support or explanation. See infra notes 141-144 and accompanying text.
123 To my knowledge, the only trial in a derivatives case was the one re-
viewed in BankAtlantic v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 955 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir.
1992). See discussion infra notes 233-236 and accompanying text.
124 Because parties often use special purpose vehicles, subsidiaries, off-shore
partnerships, and corporations, and other intermediaries, it often is difficult to
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such a case to be impossible. Moreover, any decision would
probably have vast repercussions, potentially affecting trillions of
dollars of transactions. No judge wants to be accused of bringing
down a market, especially in New York where many derivatives
disputes are filed.
3.2.1. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
One of the core common law claims in financial disputes has
been breach of fiduciary duty.1 25 However, the derivatives cases
on fiduciary duty have been so conflicted, muddled, and restrictive
that many plaintiffs are now choosing not to include fiduciary duty
claims in their complaints. This is due in large part to an effort to
avoid the cost associated with resolving complex motions to dis-
miss and for the strategic reason of avoiding early partial dis-
missal, which now seems likely given recent case law.
Fiduciaries and fiduciary concepts have a long history in the
law, beginning with Roman law. 26 Yet there is no clear definition
of a fiduciary or a fiduciary relationship. As Justice Frankfurter
discern the true counterparties to a particular transaction, a fact some derivatives
sellers have attempted to use to distance themselves from purchasers.
125 In contrast to the stock markets, where most breach of fiduciary duty
claims arise in the context of shareholder suits against managers and directors,
most of the breach of fiduciary claims in the derivatives context have been by one
party to a derivatives contract alleging a breach of fiduciary duty by the other, not
by shareholders alleging breach of fiduciary duties by managers. There are some
shareholder against management cases, however. For example, in the litigation
related to Orange County's losses on derivatives, shareholders of Merrill Lynch &
Co. sued the company's directors in New York state court for breach of fiduciary
duty to Merrill and its shareholders. However, the suit was dismissed in part be-
cause shareholders failed to support their assertion that a pre-suit demand on the
board would have been futile. See Wilson v. Tully, 676 N.Y.S.2d 531 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1998); Shareholder Suit Against Merrill Lyndz Dismissed for Failure to MaL- Pre-
Suit Demand, PROF. LIAB. LMc. Rm., Aug. 1999, at 10. For a discussion of such
suits based on hedging decisions by managers, see Kimberly D. Krawiec, Deriva-
tives, Corporate Hedging, and Shareholder 14ealth: Maodigliani-Miller Forty Years Later,
1998 U. Lui L. REv. 1039, 1102-04 (1998); see also George Crawford, A Fiduciary
Duty to Use Derivatives?, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FiN. 307, 329-30 (1995) (discussing a
hypothetical suit that imposed a duty on the trustee to use derivatives as a hedge).
126 The term fiduciary is derived from Roman law. In general, a fiduciary
was a person holding the character of a trustee. For example, a fiduciary heir (0-
duciaries heres) was the person who was instituted heir and who was charged to
deliver the succession to a person designated by the testament. A fiducia was an
early form of mortgage under Roman law. See BLAc' s LAW DICriONARY 563-64
(5th ed. 1979).
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famously put it, "[t]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins
analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fi-
duciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary?" 127 These
inquiries rarely lead to dear answers.
In recent years, fiduciary notions have become hopelessly
muddled in many areas of law. The term fiduciary is infused with
the concept of trust; a fiduciary holds something in trust for an-
other. But the term also includes notions of power and duty; a fi-
duciary relationship is created when one person is given power
and the duty to use that power to help another person. 28 The term
fiduciary is an objective notion; a person either is a fiduciary or is
not, and fiduciary duties may be triggered or halted 129 based on
certain objective standards of conduct or behavior. 30
For example, much of corporate law is fiduciary duty law.
Corporate law says that directors and officers of corporations-and
sometimes shareholders -are in a fiduciary relationship with their
corporation and its shareholders. Many corporate law scholars
view fiduciary duty simply as a gap filler. As two leading corpo-
rate law scholars have noted, "[c]orporate law-and in particular
the fiduciary principle enforced by courts-fills in the blanks and
oversights with the terms that people would have bargained for
had they anticipated the problems and been able to transact cos-
tlessly in advance."131
127 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80,85-86 (1943).
128 J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 97 (1981).
129 There is no fixed scale for measuring fiduciary duty, although the courts
have balanced allowing fiduciaries to act or transact with protecting shareholders.
See ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW
182 (1999); see also Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1961) (indicating that
fiduciary duties are subject to "no fixed scale").
130 Interestingly, the term fiduciary also refers to the "system of marking in
the reticule of an optical instrument used as a reference point or a measuring
scale." WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE DICrIONARY 475 (1984).
131 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1416,1444-45 (1989). The hypothetical bargain approach of corpo-
rate law assumes that managers and shareholders have symmetric information.
Fiduciary duty default rules thus are intended to ameliorate asymmetric informa-
tion that actually persists. It is necessary to impose duties on management, be-
cause it is the rule that shareholders and managers would have agreed to absent
transaction costs, i.e., it is the rule necessary to resolve the information asymmetry
between shareholders and management. If management has superior informa-
tion, the argument goes, fiduciary duty rules are necessary to prevent manage-
ment from using such information to exploit shareholders.
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With this uncertainty about fiduciary duty as a backdrop, par-
ties began adding breach of fiduciary duty claims to their deriva-
tives complaints. The results of combining fiduciary duty claims
with the facts of complex derivatives have been abysmal, as one
might expect, given the complexity surrounding each notion inde-
pendently.
The first judge to consider in detail a breach of fiduciary duty
claim by a derivatives purchaser against a seller was Judge John
Feikens of the Southern District of Ohio in the suit brought by P&G
against Bankers Trust ("BT") in 1994.132 Although most scholars
have focused on the federal securities and commodities claims in
P&G s complaint, the complaint also included a variety of state
common law claims-fraud, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary
duty, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation-in addition to
numerous federal statutory claims.133 These claims are of great in-
terest and relevance here. 34
P&G alleged that BT had not adequately explained the risks in-
herent in swap transactions P&G entered into with the bank. In
each case, the swap payments were based on complex formulas
and consisted, in economic terms, of a portfolio of forward and
option contracts. As a result of leverage, the bets embedded in the
swap contracts were very large, approaching the size of the entire
issue of a U.S. goverment bond of comparable maturity. Moreo-
ver, the swap contracts were designed in a way that masked the
size of the exposure on the contract, although the terms of the con-
tract clearly specified its payouts and a sophisticated party would
132 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio
1996). Judge Feikens's opinion remains one of the most thorough and well-
reasoned judicial considerations of any derivatives claim to date, although many
regard as dicta the discussion in that case of state common law claims.
133 The federal statutory claims included alleged violations of section 17 of
the Securities Act of 1933, sections 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, sections 4b and 4o of the Commodity Exchange Act, and section 32.9
of the Rules of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. See id. at 1274. P&G
also included claims based on Ohio state law, including violation of Ohio Blue
Sky Laws and the Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act. See id. Gibson Greetings,
Inc., a manufacturer of greeting cards, filed a suit alleging similar state common
law claims against Bankers Trust on September 12, 1994. See Gibson Greetings,
Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., No. C-1-94-620 (S.D. Ohio filed Sept. 12, 1994).
134 At the time, there already existed a body of statutory law and common
law cases for use in resolving the federal claims. However, the state common law
claims were novel in the derivatives context and to some extent still are.
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have been able to analyze the swap's exposure. In addition, there
were recordings of BT salespeople discussing misrepresentations
related to such swap valuations. The suit was settled well before
trial, with P&G agreeing to pay $35 million of the roughly $200
million it owed.3 5
P&G contended that a fiduciary relationship existed between it
and BT. Judge Feikens granted BT's motion for summary judg-
ment as to P&G's claim of breach of fiduciary duty but noted that
"[tihis does not mean, however, that there are no duties and obli-
gations in their swaps transactions." 136 It is difficult to interpret
this sweeping statement. How are market participants to know if
the seller bank owes a fiduciary duty of any kind or scope? Did
P&G's size or sophistication matter to this determination? Was the
nature of the relationship between P&G and BT a factor? Was the
swap's structure relevant? Was the fact that a swap was individu-
ally tailored to a particular counterparty evidence that the pur-
chaser was receiving some special treatment? Although this Ohio
decision did not bind other courts outside of Ohio deciding breach
of fiduciary duty claims under New York law, it did create uncer-
tainty for future cases.
In a more recent similar case, involving a more complex prod-
uct sold to a less sophisticated purchaser, a New York state court
also rejected a breach of fiduciary duty claim. In 1994 and 1995,
Societe Nationale D'Exploitation Industrielle Des Tabacs
("SEITA"), the French national tobacco company, lost $29 million
on two swap transactions it entered into with Salomon Brothers
International Limited ("SBIL").137 According to the allegations, a
SBIL salesman in London, Gilles Albou, acted fraudulently and
concealed certain risks in order to convince former SEITA treas-
urer, Marc Tardieu, that he could make millions of dollars for his
company by investing in two swaps.138
135 Gibson agreed to pay $6.18 million of the roughly $20 million it owed to
BT. See Bennett & Matin, supra note 13, at 3 n.l (describing resolution of Procter
& Gamble and Gibson Greetings cases).
136 Procter & Gamble, 925 F. Supp. at 1289.
137 See SD NY Denies French Firm Federal Jurisdiction for Suit over U.S. Swaps,
DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP., July 8,1996, at 3.
1m One swap was tied to the German mark; the other was tied to the Japanese
yen. See id.
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Thus, the facts resembled those of the earlier P&G case. SBIL,
like BT, ran a sophisticated derivatives trading operation, while
SEITA, like P&G, obviously was less sophisticated. SEITA had far
less experience with derivatives than P&G, which had been trading
billions of dollars of derivative instruments for several years.139
The derivative SEITA purchased was a complex swap that SBIL
had designed in a way that masked both its size and risk and that a
sophisticated buyer might have understood fully, but that SEITA
likely did not. The instrument SEITA purchased involved a port-
folio of digital (or binary) options140 and therefore was more diffi-
cult to evaluate than P&G's swap with BT. New York law applied
in both cases, although SEITA's suit was in state court in New
York, not in Ohio.141
In deciding SBIL's motion for summary judgment, Judge
Charles Edward Ramos found that SEITA was a sophisticated
counterparty to the swap and granted summary judgment to SBIL
on the fiduciary duty daim. 142 Unfortunately, Judge Ramos did
not clarify the coverage of the P&G case, except to note in passing
that a large French tobacco company is a sophisticated party and
was aware of the risks involved; BT had made similar arguments
in the prior case. 43
At best, Judge Ramos's five-paragraph discussion of fiduciary
duty in his opinion is of little or no value to other participants in
the derivatives industry. It fails to articulate any general principles
of law, to analyze existing precedents in other areas, to explain
which facts were important to the decision, or even to set forth the
nature of the transaction in any comprehensible detail.
At worst, Judge Ramos's cursory dismissal of the claim is very
costly. Judge Ramos's opinion has generated great uncertainty
139 See Partnoy, F.I.A.S.C.O., supra note 105, at 94.
140 Digital options pay either a fixed sum or zero (i.e., have a discontinuous
payoff) depending on some contingency. See WulMorr, supra note 9, at 34-35.
141 SELTA had sued first in federal court in New York, but that suit was dis-
missed on jurisdictional grounds. See SD NY Denies, supra note 137. SEITA's
state court suit also included other common law claims, including fraud. Societe
Nationale d'Exploitation Industrielle des Tabacs et Allumettes v. Salomon Bros.
Int'l Ltd., No. 113154/96,1998 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 219 (N.Y. Sup. CL Feb. 9,1998).
142 See Societe Nationale d'Exploitation Industrielle des Tabacs et Allumettes,
1998 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 219, at *3. Ultimately, the judge dismissed SEITA's other
claims as welL
143 See id. at *6.
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among participants in the derivatives industry, who cannot under-
stand from the opinion when, if ever, a counterparty to a deriva-
tive contract would be able to survive a summary judgment mo-
tion. The New York Appellate Division, First Department, did not
help matters by affirming the decision with little additional guid-
ance. 44 The decisions' naked rejection of fiduciary duty claims
seem to have scared plaintiffs from including such claims in their
complaints, a result that even contractarian legal scholars should
find difficult to justify based on the historical treatment of fiduci-
ary duty claims as gap-fillers in at least some circumstances.
Recent federal cases addressing these state law issues also pro-
vide little guidance. 45 The law in the Second Circuit, the leading
court for business disputes, regarding fiduciary duties owed by
brokers to clients is hopelessly muddled.146 For example, in Inde-
144 See Societe Nationale D'Exploitation Industrielle Des Tabacs et Allumettes
v. Salomon Bros. Int'l Ltd., M-1208, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5004 (N.Y. App.
Div. Apr. 27, 2000) (denying without opinion leave to appeal to the New York
Court of Appeals). The First Department of the New York Appellate Division
previously noted that it did not subscribe to the articulation of New York law in
the P&G case, although it left open the possibility of finding something more than
a "business relationship" in future cases, thereby creating additional uncertainty.
See Societe Nationale D'Exploitation Industrielle Des Tabacs et Allumettes v.
Salomon Bros. Int'l Ltd., 674 N.Y.S.2d 648,649 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
145 A few cases have attempted to resolve these issues under federal statutory
law. See, e.g., Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017 (4th Cir.
1997) (evaluating claim related to investment in mortgage derivatives under fed-
eral law).
146 To complicate the analysis further, there also are other, sometimes contra-
dictory, lines of cases on fiduciary duty in New York. One line holds that absent a
showing of "special circumstances" that could have transformed a business rela-
tionship into a fiduciary relationship, a court will dismiss a claim for fiduciary
duty; such "special circumstances" can include "control by one party of the other
[or] creation of an agency relationship." L. Magarian & Co. v. Timberland Co.,
665 N.Y.S.2d 413, 414 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (citing cases for both sets of "special
circumstances" and, finding neither, dismissing the complaint). Another line
holds that generally the legal relationship between customer and bank is arm's
length, but that a fiduciary relationship may arise when the bank "assumes con-
trol and responsibility over the customer's assets," or when "the customer places
special trust and confidence in the bank and thereby becomes dependent upon it."
ADT Operations, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 662 N.Y.S.2d 190, 192-93 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1997). There are separate, but related, cases involving insurance compa-
nies. See, e.g., Goshen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., No. 95-006, 1997 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 486, at *33-34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 24, 1997) (citing both "special trust and
confidence" and "dependence" prongs of the banking fiduciary duty test).
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pendent Order of Foresters v. Donaldson, Lu/kin & Jenrette, Ic., 147 the
Second Circuit upheld the dismissal of a complaint, noting that
where there were insufficient allegations to support a finding of
any broader duties, a broker owes a client only limited duties with
respect to a non-discretionary account.148 However, in interpreting
Independent Order of Foresters and a similar, later Second Circuit
case,149 Judge Koeltl, in Kwiatkowski v. Bear Stearns ("Kviatkowski
/,),150 held that it remains clear that the
relationship between a broker and its client is fiduciary in
nature and that duties broader than those related to the
execution of a transaction may arise as a result of the par-
ticular relationship between the broker and the client and
the scope of the matters with which the broker is en-
trusted. '5
The catch phrase noting the existence of a fiduciary duty, but
limiting its scope to "matters relevant to affairs entrusted to the
broker," appears in numerous recent cases in the Second Circuit.152
The results in the cases are difficult to reconcile. Consider, for
example, the differences between the allegations in Press v. Chemi-
cal Investment Services Corp.153 and Independent Order of Foresters on
one hand, and Kwviatkowski 11 on the other. In Press, the broker
147 Indep. Order of Foresters v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 157 Fqd
933 (2d Cir. 1998). This case involved the appeal of the dismissal of breach of fi-
duciary duty claims by a fraternal society that issued insurance policies and an-
nuities to its members and had invested in certain derivatives. Id.
148 These duties include, for example, a duty to notify a customer before
making trades where authorization is required and a duty to execute requested
trades. See id. at 941.
149 See Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1999)
(quoting Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 681 F. Supp. 1045, 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1938))
(attempting to reconcile the notion that the broker owes no fiduciary duty to the
client with the notion that a broker's fiduciary duty to a client is "limited to 'mat-
ters relevant to affairs entrusted to the broker").
150 Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., No. 96 Civ. 4793, 1999 US. Dist.
LEXIS 19966 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29,1999) [hereinafter Kwiatkowsld II].
131 Id. at *29.
1-2 See Press, 166 F.3d at 536; Rush, 681 F. Supp. at 1055; KwiatkOWski I1, 1999
U.S. District LEXIS 19966, at *31.
153 See Press, 166 F.3d at 529.
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failed to disclose a substantial markup on the sale of a treasury bill.
In Independent Order of Foresters, the broker failed to explain the
risks associated with several complex transactions to a "fraternal
society." In Kviatkowski II, the broker liquidated the client's posi-
tions in a downward-moving market in order to avoid unsecured
losses. In the first two cases, the fiduciary duty claim was dis-
missed; in the third, it was upheld.
Is it possible to say that secretly adding a substantial markup to
a virtually risk-free transaction or failing to advise a less sophisti-
cated party about a complex instrument is not a "matter relevant to
affairs entrusted to the broker," but that liquidating a client's posi-
tions in a volatile market is?54 The rationale for fiduciary duty
traditionally has been based on the information or sophistication
gap between the parties. It is difficult to understand how this gap
varied in the three cases, and the courts do not attempt to address
the difficulty. There certainly is no explanation, for example, of
how the plaintiff in Kwiatkowski II, but not in the other cases, could
or would have bargained for fiduciary protection absent transac-
tion costs.
It is worth setting forth in greater detail some of the facts and
analysis in Kwiatkowski II to demonstrate how difficult it is for a
judge to resolve a fiduciary duty claim in a complex financial dis-
pute.155 Before 1990, when he opened a foreign currency trading
account at Bear, Steams, Henryk de Kwiatkowski, a wealthy indi-
vidual investor,156 had "engaged in hundreds of millions of dollars
of foreign currency transactions through his bank in the Bahamas,
Bank Leu."157 Bear, Steams made standard form disclosures in
which Kwiatkowski acknowledged the risk of trading in foreign
154 Press, 166 F.3d at 536 (quoting Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 681 F. Supp.
1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
155 Moreover, Kwiatkowski II is one of the few cases from which parties can
glean the relevant facts. In other cases, facts are missing either because the judge
decided to omit them (or could not understand and articulate them) or because
the facts were under seal or subject to a confidentiality order. See, e.g., SEITA, su-
pra note 137 (limited recitation of facts does not even include a description of the
transaction). A jury awarded Kwiatkowski $164 million, and an appeal was
pending in late 2001. See Bear Stearns Says Investor's Brief Lacks "Critical Ingredi-
ent," 7 DERIVATIVES LITic. REP., Aug. 13,2001, at 3.
156 In 1991, Kwiatkowski had a net worth of $100 million. See Kwiatkowski II,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19966, at *7.
157 Id. at *6.
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currency futures, and Kwiatkowski then began trading billions of
dollars worth of currency futures on the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change ("CMIE"). As Kwiatkowski's positions increased during
late 1994, they became too large for the CME,159 and on December 6
and 7, 1994, Bear, Stearns transferred one half of his positions to
the OTC derivatives market 60 Although Kwiatkowski was mak-
ing money in late 1994, on December 28,1994, the dollar weakened
dramatically, and he lost $112 million in a few hours. Kwiatkowski
posted margin for these losses and other losses during the follow-
ing several weeks.' 6'
More than a month later, Kwiatkowski acknowledged in writ-
ing that he was an "eligible swap participant with total assets ex-
ceeding $10 million, and that he was familiar with foreign currency
transactions." 62 Bear, Stearns would have sought this acknowl-
edgment to satisfy the Part 35 swaps exemption,'63 although it
hints at some uncertainty about the exemption. In early March
1995, the dollar declined in value again, and Bear, Stearns-facing
a potentially unsecured loss-liquidated all of Kwiatkowski's po-
sitions. 64 Kwiatkowski alleged that he lost more than $300 million
because of this hurried liquidation.165
153 See id. at *6-11.
159 At one point, Kwiatkowski's positions constituted substantial percentages
of the December 1994 contracts available for trading on the CME. Scv id. at *11.
The court recognized that "the OTC market is a much larger market than the
CME, with more participants trading more currency" and that "[t]he OTC market
is also more liquid than the CME and it allows a large investor to liquidate a large
position with less impact on the market than would be the case on the CIE." Id.
at *11-12.
160 See id. at *11.
161 See Kwuiatkowski II, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19966, at 13-14.
162 See id. at *12
163 See discussion supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
164 Interestingly, Bear, Stearns seems to have liquidated Kwiatkowski's posi-
tions on Sunday, March 5,1995, a day the CME was not open. Sce Kwiatkowski v.
Bear, Stearns & Co., No. 96 Civ. 4798, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19966 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
29,1999) at *14-15. The court did not discuss this fact.
165 See id. at *15. An expert for Kwiatkowski testified that even if Kwiatkow-
ski had begun liquidating his positions by March 1,1993-a Wednesday, just four
days earlier, when the markets were more active-he would have reduced his
losses by $139 million. See id. at *20. Kwiatkowski claimed he had asked Bear,
Stearns to segregate his trading account from a larger account he was holding for
his children; instead, Bear, Steams used the children's account to provide leverage
for the OTC derivatives transactions. See Businessman's S300M Fiduciary Claims
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Consider the array of questions raised by Kwiatkowski II. What
facts are relevant in deciding whether or not a purchaser of de-
rivatives is sophisticated? Does it matter that the purchaser is an
individual, as opposed to an institution? Does it matter that the
purchaser is not from the United States? Is the amount of the
seller's profit from the sale of the derivatives relevant?166 How and
why? What is the relevance of standard form disclosures or dis-
claimers? Do they insulate a seller from liability? What is the ef-
fect of the (delayed) Part 35 acknowledgment? Does it matter if the
disputed transaction was economically equivalent to a transaction
that would not have generated losses?167 Finally, how should a
judge distinguish among federal statutory claims and state com-
mon law claims when there are extensive overlaps and some com-
mon elements?168 Kwiatkowski's claims included fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, breach of contract, 69 and claims under the
Survive Bear Steams' Summary Judgment Motion, DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP., Jan. 24,
2000, at 3.
166 The seller's profits may be relevant in several ways. First, if the profits
were very large and undisclosed, the buyer may have a claim to damages for a
portion of those profits. Second, a very large profit margin may be a sign that the
buyer did not understand the transaction; the argument is that if the buyer had
been able to value the transaction properly, it would not have paid such a large
mark-up to the seller. Alternatively, if the buyer understood the terms of the
transaction, a very large profit margin is evidence that the transaction was risky or
illiquid for the seller in ways the buyer might not have known and that the seller
might not have disclosed. Third, the seller's profits-and particularly the indi-
vidual salesperson's compensation and incentive structure-are relevant to dis-
cerning the seller's motivation to complete the transaction: was this a standard
transaction the seller entered into repeatedly with other similar counterparties, or
was it a kind of "this will make my year" transaction the seller only rarely was
able to sell?
167 For example, an OTC derivative might be economically equivalent to an
exchange-traded derivative but might nevertheless generate additional losses due
to illiquidity, large mark-ups, or other factors unique to the OTC markets.
168 In most derivatives complaints, as in most commercial complaints gener-
ally, a long recitation of facts is followed by and incorporated into much shorter,
often boilerplate, recitations of the formal claims being made in the case. In many
ways, the quandary faced by a drafter of such a complaint is not so different from
that faced by lawyers centuries ago; the major difference is that the choices (e.g.,
breach of fiduciary duty or negligent misrepresentation, as contrasted with early
common law forms of complaint, e.g., trespass) have changed.
169 The breach of contract claim alleged an oral agreement that was inconsis-
tent with the terms of a written Foreign Exchange Memorandum. See Kwiatkozwski
II, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19966, at *48.
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Commodity Exchange Act,170 all of which the court dismissed,"' as
well as claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence, which
the court allowed to proceed 2 These questions, though posed in
every derivatives dispute including Kwiatkowski II, remain unre-
solved.
Such questions are difficult to answer in part because it is so
impossible to know how much a judge will understand about the
particular OTC derivatives market and transactions at issue. An
understanding of the market is important in answering questions
about a dispute. Justice Cardozo argued that fiduciary duty was
closely linked to custom and practice. He wrote, "[s]ome relations
in life impose a duty to act in accordance with the customary mo-
rality and nothing more. In those the customary morality must be
the standard for the judge."173 Unfortunately, the "customary mo-
rality" in derivatives markets is often complex, counterintuitive,
and largely unknown to judges. In many situations, the customary
morality is that derivatives counterparties owe each other no du-
ties at all. Certainly the trillions of dollars of swap transactions
between large banks do not involve expectations of any such fidu-
ciary duty. Yet, in other instances, the customary morality is that
such duties not only are owed but also are a precondition to the
transaction. Derivatives sellers treat less sophisticated customers
differently than they treat each other, for good reason. Less so-
phisticated derivatives purchasers rely on sellers to help them un-
derstand and access complex transactions. Such reliance is effi-
dent; it would be too costly for every derivatives purchaser to
understand every nuance to every transaction. As a result, sellers
rationally should believe they owe some such duties, and their cus-
tomers should not be willing to buy from them if they do not be-
lieve they were entitled to such duties. The information and so-
phistication gap between purchasers and sellers warrants a rule
170 Kwiatkowski's CEA claims included a claim that Bear, Stearns had solic-
ited and dealt in illegal futures transactions. This claim, which was dismissed,
would have raised the complex web of issues discussed supra in Section 3.1.
171 See Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., No. 96 Civ. 4793, 1997 US. Dist.
LEXIS 13078 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29,1997) at *37-38 (dismissing claims pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)) [hereinafter Kwiatkowski 1].
172 See Kwiatkowski II, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19966, at*2-3.
173 Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of te Judicial Process, in SELECTED WRMITNGS
OF BENJAmN NATHAN CARDOZO 107,152 (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947).
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that the seller owes the buyer at least some limited duty in some
circumstances.
Yet the courts have neither understood the implications of the
"customary morality" of the derivatives industry nor the tradi-
tional analysis of fiduciary duty claims. Courts have recognized
two poles of fiduciary duty analysis: one where no duties are owed
and another where they are. The problem is that, in derivatives
cases, courts have not clarified where the line is drawn. That fail-
ure to draw the line has generated great uncertainty.
My point here is not necessarily that the line should be drawn
in a particular location as to fiduciary duty claims; I would hope
that a sophisticated, fully informed judge with adequate time and
resources who engaged in a careful hypothetical bargain analysis
could do a fine job. Instead, my point is that the common law has
failed to draw such a line at all. It may be that it is simply too diffi-
cult and costly for the judges selected to hear the relatively small
number of real adjudicated derivatives disputes to draw these lines
in the manner suggested here. If so, the common law of fiduciary
duty as applied to derivatives-related disputes may be doomed to
uncertainty.
3.2.2. Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation
Derivatives complaints also have included fraud and fraud-
related claims. Like fiduciary duty analysis, the treatment of fraud
has deep historical roots. The common law of fraud is relatively
easy to describe, even if results in individual cases are difficult to
predict.
Fraud involves reliance by one party to its detriment on a ma-
terial misstatement made by the other party. Fraud in the deriva-
tives context can be relatively easy to assess. Consider, for exam-
ple, the 1994 civil cases brought by the government against BT.174
In related cases, the SEC and CFTC found BT had committed fraud
in its dealings with Gibson Greetings and fined the bank $10 mil-
lion, in part because the derivatives were too complicated for Gib-
174 See In re BT Securities Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 35,136, [1994-1995
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,477, (Dec. 22, 1994); In re BT Securi-
ties Corp., CFTC Docket No. 95-3, app. A, at 2 (Dec. 22,1994). In these cases, tape
recordings indicated that BT employees had lied about material elements of the
transactions, including how they should be evaluated over time. Given such evi-
dence, a fraud case can be simple, even in the derivatives context.
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son Greetings employees to understand and in part because BT
employees misrepresented the value of the derivatives at various
points. 75 Similarly, the fraud claims involved in cases filed by sev-
eral Korean institutions against Morgan Guaranty ("Morgan") in-
volved complex facts but required relatively simple analysis.7 6
However, the fact that fraud claims in derivatives cases might
not be complex analytically does not necessarily mean they will be
simple to resolve. The question remains as to what facts support a
claim of fraud. Because the facts in derivatives cases can be diffi-
cult so can the resolution of a fraud claim. For example, Martin A.
Armstrong, president of Princeton Economics International Ltd.
("Princeton"), was a defendant in several cases related to hundreds
of millions of dollars of losses on structured notes'77 Princeton sold.
Japan-based Amada Co. ("Amada") and its subsidiaries bought
$123 million of these notes from Princeton. 78 Amada alleged that
Princeton falsely represented that the notes' value was based on
Princeton's holdings of AAA-rated U.S. government securities.
Amada sued in the Southern District of New York, claiming viola-
tions of federal securities laws, common law fraud, breach of fidu-
ciary duty, and unjust enrichment.
The resolution of Amada's fraud claim depends not on any dif-
ficulties related to the law of fraud but to complex fact questions
related to Princeton's representations. The key facts involve the
nature of the AAA-rated U.S. government securities that formed
the basis of the deals. Before the development of structured notes,
the moniker "AAA-rated U.S. government security" indicated a
safe, low risk investment. That indication is no longer true. In-
stead, such a label now says virtually nothing about the market
risk of an instrument: AAA relates only to credit risk and can mask
all sorts of non-credit-related risks.7 Highly rated issuers, in-
175 See sources cited supra note 174.
176 See discussion infra notes 181-195 and accompanying text.
17 Structured notes are a type of derivative instrument in which the pay-
ments of the note are linked to one or more variables using mathematical formu-
las. See Partnoy, Regulatory Arbitrage, supra note 1, at 220-21.
178 See Japanese Company Sues NY Bank for $123M Alleging Investment Fraud, 5
BANK & LENDER LLAB. LMG. REP., Jan. 19, 2000, at 5.
179 See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Tumbs
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. LQ. 619 (1999).
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cluding the U.S. government and its agencies, issue securities with
a wide variety of market risk and leverage.180
Among the most prominent recent fraud cases in the deriva-
tives area are a series of suits filed in the Southern District of New
York arising out of losses sustained by several Korean entities on
purchases from Morgan'81 of derivative instruments linked to the
currency of Thailand, known as the baht. A brief recitation of
some publicly available facts from these cases will show how com-
plex even a relatively simple fraud case can become in the deriva-
tives context.182
In 1997, Morgan arranged a series of complex derivatives
transactions for SK Securities and several other Korean counter-
parties. The transactions involved the establishment of Malaysian
special purpose investment funds 83 that borrowed money to pur-
chase units of a Korean trust, which then used the proceeds to pur-
chase Korean stocks, bonds, or complex derivatives. The loans
were to be repaid through a series of one-year-maturity total return
swap transactions. 84 At the termination of these swaps, Morgan
was to sell the trust units and pay the Malaysian funds the value of
those units plus (or minus) an amount to be determined by refer-
ence to a formula based on a comparison of the prices of the Thai
baht and Japanese yen currencies to the U.S. dollar at the dates of
inception and termination of the underlying agreement,18 as well
180 See id. at 660-62.
181 Morgan Guaranty is a U.S.-based lending institution and a subsidiary of
J.P. Morgan, a large U.S. commercial bank and one of the leading participants in
the derivatives market. I served as a consultant to certain Korean entities during
portions of this litigation.
182 Some of the details of these transactions are described in complaints avail-
able through the Derivatives Litigation Reporter. See, e.g., Second Am. Compl.,
Korea Life Ins. Co. v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 99 Civ. 12175 (May 17, 2000),
reprinted in 6 DERIVATIVES LirIG. REP., July 3, 2000, at Al-All.
183 In the derivatives market, it is very common for transactions to involve so-
called "special purpose" entities, which are established solely for the purpose of a
given transaction or group of transactions. See Partnoy, Regulatory Arbitrage, supra
note 1, at 221-22. Such special purpose entities typically are needed so the trans-
action is in compliance with, or takes advantage of, a particular regulation. See id.
184 In a total return swap, one party pays or receives the total return on some
asset in exchange for paying or receiving a pre-specified periodic amount.
185 Robert W. McSherry, Candlelight, Midnight Sessions, and Dealings in the
Dark: SD VY Transcript Outlines the Road to a "Complex" Settlement, SEc. Lmc. &
REG. REP., Nov. 10,1999, at 13.
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as the value of the underlying stocks, bonds, or other derivatives.
Needless to say, the derivatives transactions were far from "plain
vanilla" interest rate swaps.
After the Thai baht collapsed on July 2,1997,186 the valuation of
the total return swaps moved dramatically against the Korean par-
ties and in favor of Morgan. Because the Malaysian companies in-
volved had been created only for purposes of this transaction, and
therefore had no other assets, Morgan looked to the Korean com-
196 There have been several substantial disputes over derivatives losses in
Asia, including numerous losses related to the Thai baht collapse and ensuing cri-
sis in Asia. This collapse in foreign exchange rates triggered a second wave of de-
rivatives disputes, in the same way the increase in short-term interest rates in
early 1994 triggered the first wave. The companies that lost large amounts of
money on derivatives included: Japanese companies such as Yakult Honsha, a
maker of fermented beverages, Alps Electric, a maker of electronics parts, Ao-
yama Trading, a fashion retailer, and Showa Shell Sekiyu K.K, an oil refiner, sev-
eral large Indonesian corporate groups, including the Indah Kiat, Sinar Mas, and
Tanoto groups, and several companies and corporate groups in Korea, Thailand,
and Malaysia. See Bennett & Matin, supra note 13, at 6-7 (describing details of
losses). Japanese companies in particular incurred large losses from derivative
contracts. Many of these losses were not caused by any market movements but
were actually the losses associated with gains previously recognized on mirror
derivative contracts. In the mid-1990s, Japanese companies were notorious for
engaging in sham transactions that generated immediate false accounting profits,
that pushed the corresponding losses to a future date. The losses recognized by
many of these companies were simply the inevitable losses associated with previ-
ous false accounting gains. For a detailed description of such transactions, see
PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O., supra note 105, ch. 10.
Japanese regulatory authorities encouraged these sham transactions during
the 1990s, perhaps because they believed accurate disclosure of the companies'
poor financial conditions would have hurt the economy, or perhaps because they
believed the economy might improve, thereby reducing future losses. In any
event the regulators abruptly changed position in 1993, even suspending one non-
Japanese bank's license for selling such transactions.
Beginning in 1998, however, the financial authorities changed their
regulatory posture on window dressing transactions. Responding to
both international and domestic pressure to address the problems in the
country's banking system, the regulators determined that window
dressing was an inappropriate market practice. Because of the ambiguity
of the legal and accounting framework for financial derivatives in Japan,
this policy [reversal] shift was possible without any change or amend-
ment to any regulation and without providing market participants with
any advance notice. The most dramatic result of this policy ... was the
severe penalties imposed on Credit Suisse.
Bennett & Matin, supra note 13, at 29 (footnotes omitted).
Such an abrupt change in position adds to the regulatory uncertainty con-
cerning financial derivatives.
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panies and to four Korean guarantors to pay on the swaps187 The
Korean entities refused to pay and litigation ensued.
On February 10, 1998, two of the losing parties sued Morgan in
the Southern District of New York, alleging violations of federal
securities laws; a few days later, Morgan sued in the same court
alleging breach of contract.188 The Korean entities alleged that
Morgan concealed information about the transactions, including
insider knowledge that the Thai central bank was preparing to al-
low the baht to devalue. Thus, the claims sounded in fraud.
Although numerous issues in the case were complex, one ap-
peared to be quite simple. One of the Korean guarantor banks,
Housing & Commercial Bank ("HCB"), alleged that Morgan had
inserted new pages into an already initialed document, thereby
changing HCB's limited guarantee of $50 million to an unlimited
guarantee. 189  (The losses greatly exceeded $50 million.) Such
straightforward allegations, if true, established a relatively simple
case of fraud. The allegations involving the other banks were more
complex but also included fraud. However, the Korean entities
and Morgan had ongoing business relationships 90 and were able
to agree to settle several of the cases.19 Obviously, HCB was as-
sisted in its settlement negotiations by the fact that it was able to
allege a relatively simple fraud case. 92
However, note how little value the litigation and settlement of
these complex claims generated for participants in the derivatives
market. Parties to the case, and more importantly their attorneys,
may have, through intuition, a sense of how the judge in the cases,
the Honorable Alvin K. Hellerstein, might rule in future cases.
Although confidentiality orders governed the dispute, sufficient
facts became public to give non-parties some sense of the factual
187 The four Korean guarantors were SK Securities, Hannam Investment Se-
curities, Housing & Commercial Bank, and Boram Bank. See id.
188 See id.; see also J.P. Morgan Sues S. Korean Banks, Securities Firm Over Deriva-
tives Deals, 30 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 282 (Feb. 20, 1998) (detailing J.P.
Morgan's lawsuit against South Korean banks).
189 See Korean Bank: Morgan Fudged, BOND BUYER, Apr. 27,1998, at 1.
190 The transcript of the settlement conference describes the parties as "busi-
ness partners." See McSherry, supra note 185, at 13.
191 J.P. Morgan & Co., parent of Morgan Guaranty, agreed to purchase a sub-
stantial stake in SK Securities and to forgo payment of the $300 million it was
owed. The value of the settlement was estimated at $250 million. See id.
192 See Morgan Fudged, supra note 189, at 1.
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basis for the fraud claims. But because the parties settled the case
subject to a confidentiality agreement, Judge Hellerstein's role was
simply to grant the stipulated dismissal 93 without a detailed
opinion. Neither he nor any other judge in New York would be
bound by his actions in this series of cases. Nor would any future
party benefit from any of the wisdom or judgment Judge Heller-
stein accumulated during the litigation. Notwithstanding the mil-
lions of dollars of legal fees spent to resolve one of the largest de-
rivatives disputes in history, the result was absolutely no common
law-not a single legal rule-of use to future parties.
Not every Korean entity settled its claims, and there are ongo-
ing disputes involving Morgan, so there is some chance a common
law precedent will still be established. In a related case also before
Judge Hellerstein, Korea Life Insurance Co. ("KLr) sued Morgan
for fraud, unjust enrichment, frustration of commercial purpose,
negligent misrepresentation, lack of authority, breach of the duty
of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of the New York
gaming laws. 94 In this suit, KLI seeks approximately $100 million
in damages it allegedly incurred on derivatives linked to the Thai
baht and Japanese yen. 95 Part of the fraud claim in KLI's com-
plaint relates to the structure of the transaction; part of the claim
relates to Morgan's use of information it procured to the disad-
vantage of KU_ without disclosing that information in advance.196
This latter argument has empirical support, there is evidence of
dealers acting to take advantage of information in the foreign ex-
change markets to the detriment of their counterparties.19 7
193 See id.
194 See Korean Insurer's NY Swaps Suit Seeks $350Mfroim Morgan Guaranty Trust
Co., 6 DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP., Jan. 24, 2000, at 7.
195 See id. (describing negative effect of devaluation of Thai baht on the in-
vestment).
196 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 182, at 6-14.
197 For example, in early 1995, when the Japanese yen appreciated towards
the "knock-out" levels relevant to a series of structured derivatives transactions,
dealers had an incentive to push the value of the yen up through these levels and
thus eliminate their obligations on the transactions. See STEINHERR, supra note 1, at
109. There is evidence that dealers did precisely this. See A.M. MaIz, Currency
Option Markets and Exchange Rates: A Case Study of the U.S. Dollar in Mardi 1995,1
CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN. No. 4 (July 1995) (describing substantial increase
in such transactions during the relevant period of time).
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Judge Hellerstein has a unique opportunity in this suit to con-
tribute an important common law decision to the global deriva-
fives market, an opportunity Holmes would have relished. The
case was pending as of late 2001.
In addition to "straight" fraud claims, fraud-related complaints
often include claims filed under the heading "negligent misrepre-
sentation." The law of negligent misrepresentation is more com-
plex than that of fraud and generates some additional difficulties in
derivatives disputes. Nevertheless, the analysis of negligent mis-
representation claims, and the duties required for such claims, par-
allels that of fiduciary duty claims.198
In general, a defendant is liable for negligent misrepresentation
only from the breach of a duty running to the injured plaintiff.199
Specifically, in the commercial context, this rule means that to be
liable a defendant must "possess unique or specialized expertise,
or... [be] in a special position of confidence and trust with the in-
jured party such that reliance on the negligent misrepresentation is
justified."200 The facts that justify a finding of such special position
include whether the person making the representations knew how
the information would be used and whether this person appeared
to hold a position of trust and confidence.201
New York courts have distinguished between: (1) commercial
actors such as insurance agents, who are not in a better position
than their client insureds to know the insured's personal assets and
ability to protect themselves; and (2) other providers of services,
such as doctors, attorneys, or architects, who are in a better posi-
tion than their clients to know and understand such information.20 2
198 See, e.g., Pinky Originals, Inc. v. Bank of India, No. 94 Civ. 3568, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15575, at *78 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 1996) (grouping together negligent
misrepresentation and fiduciary claims and noting that "plaintiffs' claims prem-
ised on negligent misrepresentation, failure to disclose, and breach of fiduciary
duty are dependent on a showing that the Bank owed some fiduciary duty to the
plaintiffs").
199 See, e.g., Kimmell v. Schaefer, 89 N.Y.2d 257, 263 (1996) ("Liability for neg-
ligence may result only from the breach of a duty running between a tortfeasor
and the injured party.").
200 Id.
201 Id. Professionals, including lawyers and accountants, are subject to higher
duties. Id. at 263-64.
202 See, e.g., Murphy v. Kuhn, 90 N.Y.2d 266 (1997) (affirming grant of defen-
dant's motion to dismiss plaintiff insured's claims for tortious misrepresentation
and breach of implied contract).
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The cases do not specifically mention derivatives dealers. The
question remains whether (and when) a buyer of derivatives is "at
a substantial disadvantage to question the actions of the provider
of services."2 3
When might a derivatives purchaser be at a substantial disad-
vantage to question the actions of the seller? The cases seem to in-
dicate that when a sophisticated party is "ripped off" by another
sophisticated party, there is no cause of action. 4 However, cases
are less dear about facts that do not rise to the level of fraud or
breach of fiduciary duty, yet involve one party that is more so-
phisticated than the other and therefore might support a negligent
misrepresentation claim.
For example, in Kwiatkoski II there was evidence of a "sub-
stantial advisory relationship"20S between the purchaser and seller.
Does providing financial advice trigger a duty that would support
a negligent misrepresentation claim? It is difficult to know how to
draw such a line. Courts have not done it, and lawyers pressing
such claims have had difficulty articulating any such line. In both
Press and Independent Order of Foresters, the courts criticized the
formulation and drafting of the complaint as inadequate. 0 s In
contrast, in Kwiatkowski I the district court made great use of the
detailed allegations in the complaint and favorably cited the testi-
mony of several experts: (1) that the plaintiff was exposed to an
excessive risk of loss; (2) that based on existing industry standards
the defendants should have advised him of this risk; (3) that the
defendants did not provide sufficient supervision or monitoring of
the plaintiff s positions; and (4) that the defendants failed to de-
velop an appropriate "exit strategy" for liquidating the contracts. 7
20 Id.
204 See Compania Sud-Americana de Vapores, S.A. v. IBJ Shroder Bank &
Trust Co., 785 F. Supp. 411,426 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (calling the suit by a plaintiff who
was charged very high mark-ups in foreign currency transactions "merely an ef-
fort to avoid the repercussions of its lack of diligence in monitoring the rates at
which conversions were made for over six years").
205 See Kwiatkowski II, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19966, at*33.
206 See Indep. Order of Foresters v. Donalds, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 157 F.3d
933, 937-38 (2d Cir. 1998) (pointing out absence and limitation of allegations); see
also Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 988 F. Supp. 375, 386-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(characterizing the complaint as a "naked allegation").
207 See Kwiatkowski II, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19966, at 39.
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Thus, the difference in the cases may be due more to the quality of
the lawyering than to any distinguishing feature of fact or law.
The differences in these cases present some bitter ironies. Per-
haps the existence of a duty depends more on the quality of the
lawyering than on the facts in a particular case. Perhaps it is easier
for a judge to jettison a case on a motion to dismiss, before the par-
ties have had a chance to gather evidence, than on a motion for
summary judgment, even though the law states that allegations
made in a complaint are assumed to be true for purposes of de-
ciding a motion to dismiss. In any event, judges and lawyers faced
with fraud-related claims in derivatives cases have had a difficult
time, and the result is pitiful: increased uncertainty for participants
in the derivatives market and virtually no common law guidance.
3.2.3. Lack of Authority
The once-important topics of agency and authority receive
short shrift in law school today.2 8 Yet in recent derivatives dis-
putes, authority issues have been important, even dispositive.
The authority argument in the context of derivatives is rela-
tively simple. A financial derivative transaction is simply a con-
tract, typically between two parties. If one party did not have legal
authority to enter into that contract, it is not binding on that party.
Alternatively, even if the party did not have actual legal
authority, the party might be bound if there was apparent authority.
Apparent authority is a common law concept holding that a prin-
cipal may be bound by the actions of an agent who does not have
actual authority when the principal acts in a way that reasonably
could lead a third party to conclude that the principal consented to
the agent's exercise of authority.209
208 Many schools do not offer courses in agency, although the topic receives
brief treatment at the beginning of many corporate law casebooks. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 33-45 (4th ed. 2000) (discussing agency
and apparent authority); see also MELVIN A. EISENBERG, AN INTRODUCTION TO
AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 1-27 (2d ed. 1995) (introducing agency and the agent's
authority and duties).
209 See, e.g., JAMES D. Cox ET AL., CORPORATIONS 129-30 (1997) (describing ap-
parent authority).
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Plaintiffs have claimed in derivatives disputes that the under-
lying transactions were illegal or unauthorized 0 For example, in
Sumitomo Corp. v. J.P. Morgan & Co.,211 Sumitomo argued both: (1)
that derivatives financing transactions entered into by an individ-
ual trader were unauthorized because only Sumitomo's treasury
department-not any individual trader-could authorize financing
on behalf of Sumitomo; and (2) that the transactions were prohib-
ited by Japanese law. 2 These two claims-lack of authority and
illegality-are often put together. Lack of authority stems from the
fact that a grant of authority was illegal; illegality, in turn, implies
that an individual lacked authority.
Courts have held that contracts made in violation of a country's
law (or with a view of being in violation of that country's law) are
unenforceable. 23 In Sumitomo Corp. v. 1.P. Morgan & Co., for exam-
ple, a Sumitomo copper trader, Yasuo Hamanaka, obtained fi-
nancing from J.P. Morgan without the approval of Sumitomo's
treasury department or board of directors. Sumitomo's argument
was that if approval was required and not given, the transactions
were null and void. Alternatively, Article 260 of the Japanese
210 The first prominent derivatives case in the area was a British case holding
that derivatives transactions entered into by the London boroughs of Fulham and
Hammersmith were contrary to law. Hazell v. Hanunersmith & Fulham London
Borough Council, 2 W.L.R. 372 (ELL. 1991). The state of West Virginia raised
similar claims in West Virginia v. Morgan Stanley. State v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,
459 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1995). Authority issues also arose in the Orange County
litigation. Orange County sued the brokers who sold it certain derivatives and
alleged that the transactions were ultra vires, or beyond the limits of the law. The
specific allegation was that the investment strategy was so risky it violated Cali-
fornia law and that the brokers had a duty to halt their business dealings with Or-
ange County and report the activities. See Orange Counh, Brokers File Cross-
Motions for Summary Judgment, DERIVATIv Lmc. REP., Oct. 15,1993, at 5. Orange
County also claimed that certain reverse repurchase transactions it entered into
with the brokers violated state law and would have required voter approval. Id.
211 See Sumitomo Corp. v. J.P. Morgan & Co., No. 99 Civ. 3780,2000 US. Dist.
LEXIS 1252 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7,2000).
212 See Memorandum of Plaintiff Sumitomo Corporation in Opposition to De-
fendants' Motion to Dismiss Certain Claims in the Complaint at 32, Sumitomo
Corp. v. J.P. Morgan & Co., No. 99-CV-8780 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2000) [hereinafter
Sumitomo Memorandum] (on file with author).
213 See, e.g., Rutkin v. Reinfeld, 229 F.2d 248, 255 (2d Cir. 1956) (commenting
that a contract entered into "with a view of violating the laws of another country
... is unenforceable"); Dornberger v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 961 F. Supp. 506, 532-33
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that a contract made in violation of European law was
subject to rescission).
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Commercial Code prohibited such financing transactions without
approval of the board of directors.214 According to this argument,
if Japanese law required board approval and approval was not
given, then the transactions were illegal, and therefore were void.
Authority issues also can arise based on the scope of an in-
vestment agreement between two parties, where one is investing in
derivatives on behalf of the other. For example, AT&T Corp' s
pension plan and the Massachusetts Pension Reserves Investment
Trust lost a combined $162 million based on unauthorized trading
by the chief investment officer of Rhumbline Advisers, an invest-
ment adviser the two pension funds were using.215
Authority issues have arisen in recent derivatives disputes in
Asia. For example, Indonesian corporations often have a two-
tiered board structure and articles of association requiring that
major financial transactions be approved by both boards-the
board of directors, which has general executive authority, and the
board of commissioners, which oversees and advises the direc-
tors.216 Unfortunately, Indonesian law and most articles of asso-
ciation are unclear about when the board of commissioners must
approve a transaction. Although in theory, a party could eliminate
authority-related risk by requiring the board of commissionef s
approval, most Indonesian companies balk at obtaining such ap-
proval.217
Plaintiffs in derivatives disputes often include, along with lack
of authority claims, an argument that the derivatives were not
suitable investments.218 The underlying rationale for suitability
214 Article 260 provides that "[t]he Board [of Directors] cannot delegate the
following decisions to a manager, but must itself make them: ... (2) Borrowing a
substantial sum of money." 12 COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD 40 (Foreign Tax
Law Pubs. 1993). The amount borrowed in this case was approximately $283 mil-
lion (in Japanese yen) arguably a "substantial sum." Sumitomo Memorandum,
supra note 212, at 33.
215 See Orange County, supra note 210, at 5.
216 See Bennett & Marin, supra note 13, at 30 n.121 (citing advice received by
the authors from the Jakarta law firm of All Budiardjo, Nugroho, Reksodiputro).
217 See id. at 31 n.123.
218 See Bennett & Marin, supra note 13, at 35. For a recent general discussion
of suitability claims in the securities context, see Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R.
Bromberg, Suitability in Securities Transactions, 54 Bus. LAW. 1557 (1999). There are
numerous articles about derivatives and suitability. See, e.g., Geoffrey B. Gold-
man, Crafting a Suitability Requirement for the Sale of Over-the-Counter Derivatives:
Should Regulators "Punish the Wall Street Hounds of Greed?", 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1112
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claims is similar to that for breach of fiduciary duty: the seller has
the information, knowledge, or sophistication advantage over the
purchaser and, therefore, owes the purchaser a duty not to mislead
him or her about the risks of the instrument and, in any event, not
to sell instruments that are too complicated for a particular pur-
chaser to understand.21 9 Unfortunately, no jurisdiction has clari-
fied what circumstances or facts would generate such a duty owed
by a derivatives seller to the buyer.
Derivatives purchasers have brought an array of common law
claims based on the notion that the instruments were not suitable.
For example, in UBS International Trustees Ltd. v. Morgan Stanley
Dean Witter & Co.,220 the plaintiff alleged, as trustee on behalf of the
purchaser who lost money on the instruments, that the purchaser
was not sophisticated in the use of leverage and derivatives.2
These suitability allegations supported common law claims of
fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. In Spring-
well Navigation Corp. v. The Chase Manhattan Bank,' 2 the plaintiff
alleged breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, professional negli-
gence, and negligent supervision, all based on the defendant's fail-
ure to inform the plaintiff that investments in certain emerging
markets bond derivatives2 3 were very risky and unsuitable for the
plaintiff's goals.224
(1995); Lyle Roberts, Suitability Claims Under Rule 10b-5: Are Public Entities Sophisti-
cated Enough to Use Derivatives?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 801 (1996).
219 This rationale is not based on some notion of fairness to particular pur-
chasers. Rather, it is an economic-based gap-filling rationale designed to benefit
the derivatives industry as a whole. Without some such perceived protection,
purchasers might not transact.
220 UBS Int'l Trs. Ltd. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., No. 99 Civ. 8937
(S.D.N.Y. amended complaint filed Dec. 20,1999).
221 See, e.g., U.K Investment Co.'s Amended Complaint Names Morgan Stanley
Director, SEC. & COMMODITIES LMG. REP., Jan. 26, 2000, at 7 (describing the sophis-
tication difference between a derivatives purchaser and Morgan Stanley).
222 See Springwell Navigation Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 99 Civ.
11855 (S.D.N.Y. complaint filed Dec. 7,1999).
m A large portion of the plaintiff's money was used to buy Russian deriva-
tives consisting of CMSCI Notes, which were tied to Russian government short-
term zero coupon ruble-denominated bonds known as Gosudarstvenniye Krat-
kosrochniye Obligatsii, or GKOs. See Greek Company Sues Chase Manhattan over
$200M Bond Derivatives Loss, DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP., Jan. 10, 2000, at 4. Interest-
ingly, the complaint's description of the derivative instrument was incomplete,
presumably because either the plaintiff or the lawyers or both were unable to un-
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Unfortunately, the legal basis for suitability claims is wrought
with ambiguity and confusion. Under U.S. law, suitability claims
typically arise out of "securities" transactions only. The National
Association of Securities Dealers has adopted suitability rules, in-
cluding rules extending suitability obligations to broker-dealers
selling securities to institutional customers.25 Outside of the
United States, the law is even less clear, and there are no guidelines
or standards describing the suitability obligations of a derivatives
seller.226 As in other areas of derivatives litigation, disputes over
suitability typically are settled before judicial decision or trial.
227
It is unclear whether suitability claims fit under breach of fidu-
ciary duty223 or lack of authority229 or whether they are even rele-
vant in OTC derivatives disputes. Courts facing lack of authority
claims have not clarified the issue.
3.2.4. Contract-Based Claims
Finally, derivatives disputes often involve claims for breach of
contract. A breach of contract claim can be relatively straightfor-
ward, even in the derivatives context. For example, in a 1997 state
court case in Maryland, a judge awarded $1.7 million to two busi-
nessmen who lost money on several currency swaps with FX Con-
cepts Inc.230 FX Concepts claimed to have a sophisticated computer
derstand and describe it. See id. ("The value of the Note was linked in as yet an
unexplained way to the value of the underlying GKOs.").
224 See id.
225 See Order Granting Proposed NASD Suitability Rule Change, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-37588, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,100 (Aug. 20,1996).
226 See Bennett & Matin, supra note 13, at 36 (noting that in Asia "[t]he local
legal systems contain neither guidelines on what constitutes a suitable derivative
nor express obligations on the part of a seller of a derivative instrument to ensure
that the instrument is suitable for the buyer in light of its particular circum-
stances").
22 See id. at 36 n.150, 38 n.160 (citing examples of suitability claims by TPI
Polene PLC, a Thai plastic and cement maker, against UBS and claims by SK Secu-
rities, a Korean firm, against J.P. Morgan & Co., both of which settled for undis-
closed amounts).
= The question in this case would be whether unsuitable trades were made
in violation of a duty owed by seller to buyer.
M9 The question in this case would be whether unsuitable trades were be-
yond the authority of a purchaser.
23D Currency Swaps: Investors Win $1.7 Million Award on Md. Claim Against
Management Firm, 29 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1455 (Oct. 17,1997).
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model that identified winning foreign currency bets.20 3 An official
of FX Concepts had instructed the employee dealing with the two
businessmen to tell them about certain risks in European curren-
cies and that employee failed to do so. The court found that failure
to deliver this instruction was a breach of contract.232
I have found only one case involving OTC derivatives that
went to trial, and that case essentially presented a breach of con-
tract daim. Although numerous other daims were involved in the
case, the verdict is based primarily on a breach of contract ration-
ale. Unfortunately, this case provides no certainty at all to a pro-
spective derivatives investor, and, in fact, contains confusing and
contradictory statements about the applicable derivatives transac-
tions.
This case, BankAtlantic v. Blythe Eastnman Paine Webber, Inc., 3
involved two interest rate swaps between two financial institu-
tions: BankAtlantic and Homestead Savings, with PaineWebber
serving as a broker to BankAtlantic. BankAtlantic lost more than
$30 million on the swaps, and sued PaineWebber for breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, fraudulent concealment,
negligence, and negligent misrepresentation. After a five-week
jury trial in 1989, the jury returned a verdict in favor of PaineWeb-
ber. BankAtlantic appealed on various grounds, and the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed.234
The opinion is notable, not for its analysis of any particular le-
gal issues, but for how little guidance it provides to any derivatives
market participant. The relevant portion of the Eleventh Circuit
opinion is as follows:
Based on PaineWebber's recommendation, BankAtlantic
entered into the two interest rate swaps with Homestead
Savings ("Homestead") in an effort to hedge its adjustable
rate deposit payables against an increase in interest rates.
Alleging non-performance under the agreement, BankAt-
lantic terminated the services of PaineWebber as financial
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 BankAtlantic v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 955 F.2d 1467 (11th
Cir. 1992).
234 Id. at 1469.
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advisor and employed another firm to assist with the inter-
est rate swaps. During this time, interest rates were falling
drastically, allegedly causing BankAtlantic to suffer losses
in excess of $30 million.
In August 1987, BankAtlantic brought suit against
PaineWebber alleging these losses were caused by
PaineWebber's failure to disclose the risks involved in in-
terest rate swaps, e.g., that if interest rates fell, the high
yielding fixed rate mortgages would be prepaid as borrow-
ers refinanced. BankAtlantic also alleged that PaineWebber
failed to disclose its extensive relationship with Homestead,
that Homestead was not creditworthy and therefore that
BankAtlantic should have obtained collateral from Home-
stead.235
That is the relevant discussion, in its entirety. The remainder of
the opinion is no more illuminating and neither is the district
court's three-page opinion and order denying the plaintiff's asser-
tions of error, motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
and motion for a new trial.236 Consider the questions someone
considering a derivatives transaction would have about this case:
What were the basic terms of the interest rate swap? Did BankAt-
lantic agree to pay a fixed rate and receive a floating rate, or vice
versa? If BankAtlantic lost money when interest rates dropped,
how were the swaps designed to hedge against an increase in in-
terest rates? If these were truly interest rate swaps, what did the
prepayment risk associated with fixed rate mortgages have to do
with the transaction? How was Homestead's credit and collateral
related to BankAtlantic's losses? Did BankAtlantic lose money be-
cause the swaps moved in its favor and Homestead defaulted, or
because the swaps moved against BankAtlantic? What was the
relationship of the parties, and was it relevant? Were there alleged
235 Id. at 1469-70.
236 See BankAtlantic v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 130 F.R.D. 153
(S.D. Fla. 1990), affd 955 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1992) (three-page opinion, less than
one page of which considers the plaintiff's motions).
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misrepresentations? A party looking for guidance from this case
will not find answers.
Other contract-based claims have been for excessive fees
charged in derivatives deals. Between 1994 and 1997, Slovnaft
A.S., the former Slovak national oil company, purchased four
structured loans from Merrill Lynch International, Inc. and lost
$175 million.237 Slovnaft sued Merrill in 1999 in New York state
court alleging that crude oil-linked derivatives embedded in the
loans had cost Slovnaft $75 million in "exorbitant" interest pay-
ments.23
Contractual duties can arise out of obligations described in
standard form agreements signed by both parties. These agree-
ments can serve as the basis for claims based on implied contrac-
tual duties. Judge Feikens found support for such a claim in the
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co. case. In that case, section 4
of the standard form ISDA agreement between the parties pro-
vided that each party must furnish specified information and that
such information must also relate to any documents specified in
the confirmation.239 In other words, the specification of such in-
formation in the standard form created a duty to furnish the speci-
fied information.
New York case law establishes such an implied contractual
duty to disclose in business negotiations. As Judge Feikens read
this duty, it may arise where: "(1) a party has superior knowledge
of certain information; (2) that information is not readily available
to the other party; and (3) the first party knows that the second
party is acting on the basis of mistaken knowledge." 40 Such a duty
237 Merrill Lynch, supra note 120, at 10.
233 See Slovnaft A.S. v. Merrill Lynch Int'l, Inc., No. 603760-99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1999).
239 Judge Feikens wrote in Procter & Gainble:
Documents that are referred to in the Confirmation (here I allude specifi-
cally to the documents that will enable a party to determine the correla-
tion between the price and yields of the five-year Treasury notes and
thirty-year Treasury bonds, the sensitivity tables, the spreadsheets re-
garding volatility, and documents relating to the yield curve) should be
provided.
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1290 (S.D. Ohio
1996).
240 See id. (citing Banque Arabe et Internationale D'lnvestissement v. Md.
Nat'l Bank, 57 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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to disclose may arise even in the absence of a fiduciary duty be-
tween the parties.241 Judge Feikens concluded "that defendants
had a duty to disclose material information to plaintiff both before
the parties entered into the swap transactions and in their per-
formance, and also a duty to deal fairly and in good faith during
the performance of the swap transactions."242
As a result, even if the duty-based claims for breach of fiduci-
ary duty, negligent misrepresentation, and suitability fail, an im-
plied breach of contract claim may survive based on obligations
created by swap documentation. Analytically, this result makes
little sense. These claims all are based on essentially the same ra-
tionale243-that sophistication or information asymmetry will sup-
port a duty to disclose material facts. This rationale is wrapped in
different packages, each with a different jurisprudence and each
with a small set of indeterminate cases. Not surprisingly, it is very
difficult for parties to derivatives transactions -even if they agree
on the facts-to know how or why a judge will resolve their dis-
pute.
3.3. The Limited Applicability of Private Law
The remaining two alternatives merit only brief consideration.
They have presented only a handful of issues relevant to deriva-
tives disputes.
The implied breach of contract claim in the P&G case just dis-
cussed is a rare instance of a claim arising out of a private deriva-
tives contract. These contracts are form agreements created by de-
rivatives dealers and their lawyers, and-not surprisingly-are
structured to ensure that derivatives contracts are not subject to
federal regulation and to prevent the survival of most non-dealer
derivatives parties' claims in a dispute with a dealer.244
Private law has evolved in the derivatives area along two
paths. The first path, designed for transactions between deriva-
241 See id. (citing numerous New York cases).
242 Id. at 1291.
243 An additional rationale not yet addressed in any derivatives dispute is
commercial frustration or impracticability. See supra note 115 and accompanying
text.
244 For a general description of such contract-based efforts in the securities
context, see Margaret V. Sachs, Freedom of Contract: The Trojan Horse of Rule 10b-5,
51 WASH. & LEEL. REv. 879 (1994).
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rives dealers, has ended in a very complete, self-regulatory mecha-
nism of little relevance in the derivatives disputes discussed here.
For private law enthusiasts, these packages of default rules are
things of beauty. The standard form contract, created by ISDA, is a
complete, well-constructed private law governing most contingen-
des that might arise between dealers.245 It is flexible, yet compre-
hensive, and is a standard within the industry. However, because
few derivatives disputes are between dealers, it is largely irrele-
vant for purposes of this discussion.
The second path, designed for transactions between dealers
and non-dealers, is much shorter, ending in a relatively small
number of non-reliance provisions included in the standard ISDA
documentation, as well as in other documentation related to de-
rivatives transactions between dealers and non-dealers, including
term sheets, economic reports and forecasts, and analysis of par-
ticular trades, including "scenario analysis." 246 These non-reliance
provisions, or "disclaimers," which are virtually the same in every
derivatives transaction, purport to absolve the dealer of liability as-
sociated with the transaction. 247 A typical disclaimer says some-
thing like "the purchaser fully understands the above terms and
conditions, including the risks and benefits of the transactions."
Derivatives sellers argue that if they obtain a signed disclaimer
of a duty and/or provide adequate scenario analysis, a purchaser
should not be able to sustain the common law claims articulated in
Section 3.2. For example, derivatives sellers argue that if a buyer
represents that the seller owes no duty to him or her, the buyer
cannot later sue to recover on a duty-based theory; similarly, a
buyer cannot later complain about oral misrepresentations if they
245 The basic form contract is the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement (Local Cur-
rency-Single Jurisdiction). There also are more complex standard forms, forms
in translation, as well as recent annexes with updated definitions. The basic form
is available to non-members through the ISDA website for $25; the complete set of
forms is $1,600. See International Swaps and Derivatives Association Inc.,
http://-vww.isda.org/index.html (last modified 2000).
246 Analysis of particular trades includes "scenario analysis," which describes
the gains and losses on a particular derivative transaction based on changes in one
or more variables. For example, scenario analysis for a swap based on a particular
index might show the financial position of the purchaser given an increase or de-
crease of one, two, and five percent in the index.
247 Courts have upheld such non-reliance clauses in the securities context.
See, e.g., Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a written
non-reliance clause prohibited recovery based on prior oral statements).
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are inconsistent with a later-signed written statement accurately
setting forth the substance of the allegedly misrepresented facts.
There is an initial question about whether disclaimers actually
are negotiated provisions that should be enforced against buyers.
If some derivatives contracts were sold with disclaimers and others
were not, there would be an argument that the disclaimers were
both negotiated and priced by the parties. It is more difficult to
make this argument when there is unanimous use of essentially
similar disclaimers. It seems incredible to argue that each such
disclaimer was priced and negotiated in a multi-billion dollar con-
tract. Neither is it credible to argue that it is sufficient if a small
number of disclaimers are priced and negotiated because then all
contracts would reflect those prices and negotiations; such an ar-
gument makes little sense in a market consisting of privately nego-
tiated, often confidential transactions.
However, even if one assumes that the disclaimers were nego-
tiated and are not adhesion contracts, there are other strong rea-
sons to believe neither a signed disclaimer nor a detailed scenario
analysis should preclude a duty-related claim. First, disclaimers or
scenario analyses may be misleading, inadequate, or fail to disclose
important information the seller possesses that the buyers do
not.248 For example, prior to the Asian crisis, numerous investment
and commercial banks had information about specific countries'
central bank practices and currency reserves and were in fact tak-
ing large speculative positions based on this information. Any
bank selling derivatives based on foreign exchange rates in those
countries would have an obvious information and knowledge ad-
vantage. If the bank did not disclose this information, and made
other disclosures (including scenario analysis) that would be made
misleading by this information, any purchaser of derivatives from
the bank would have a strong argument that the bank owed that
purchaser a duty (because of the superior information and knowl-
edge) and it breached that duty (because of the omissions and mis-
representations).
In addition, a disclaimer must be sufficiently specific to dis-
claim the misrepresentations and omissions that form the basis of a
248 See, e.g., Bennett & Marin, supra note 13, at 39 ("A scenario analysis that is
based on historical volatility, for example, may prove to be inadequate if markets
move in an unexpected manner.").
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purchaser's daim. For example, the Second Circuit has held that
the contract language must "match the alleged fraud."249 The New
York appellate courts have held that a disclaimer of reliance on
representations must be specifically related to the contents of the
fraud daim.250 For example, disclaimers related to the "physical
nature of the premises" and "environmental matters" were not suf-
ficiently specific to preclude a fraud claim based on the "presence
of underground tanks containing possible toxic chemicals."231
The policy behind these cases is, consistent with hypothetical
bargain analysis, that purchasers would not willingly accept a
broad disclaimer absent some reduction in price or increase in
quality. At the extreme, purchasers cannot (and would not ex ante)
disclaim fraud. Accordingly, such disclaimers should be read nar-
rowly, especially when the parties were in a situation involving in-
formation or sophistication asymmetry.
To the extent disclaimers arise as issues in derivatives disputes,
they should be read narrowly and certainly should not be read to
preclude purchaser claims based on inaccurate or misleading
statements. Even ISDA, the dealers' own organization, has recog-
nized this principle.252 No court has yet published an opinion on
this issue in a derivatives dispute. The first judge to do so should
carefully consider the implications of informational asymmetry in
a hypothetical bargain analysis and should not simply accept a
dealer's attempts to skirt a principle in a dispute that it previously
had endorsed through ISDA as good policy.
3.4. Some Attempts at Arbitration
Given the problems associated with the alternative means of
resolving disputes, one might expect derivatives counterparties to
249 See Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 7 F3d 310, 317 (2d Cir. 1993)
("Where the fraud claim has been dismissed, the disclaimer has been sufficiently
specific to match the alleged fraud.").
250 See Hi Tor Indus. Park, Inc. v. Chem. Bank, 494 N.YS.2d 751 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1985) (finding disclaimer clauses ineffective to bar the consideration of parol
evidence of misrepresentation unless the clauses refer to the particular subject
matter with sufficient specificity).
m5 See id. at 752.
252 See Raj Bhala, Applying Equilibrium Theory and the FICAS Model: A Case
Study of Capital Adequacy and Currency Trading, 41 ST. Louis U. LJ. 125, 209 n.369
(1996) (citing ISDA's strong recommendation that U.S. members follow the ISDA
Principles and Practices for Wholesale Financial Market Transactions).
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sign arbitration clauses. Yet arbitration of such disputes is rare.
One reason may be that both counterparties fear the uncertainty
associated with an arbitrator even more than they fear the court-
room. The recent evidence of New York Stock Exchange arbitra-
tion panels ruling against Wall Street investment banks in ways the
banks did not expect would support this reason.253
Another reason may be that more sophisticated counterparties
may prefer the less fair forum of court precisely because it is more
expensive. In court, a derivatives dealer can force a plaintiff to en-
gage in expensive litigation, which the dealer easily can afford but
the purchaser may find more difficult to sustain, especially given
the expense of discovery. Delay typically works to the dealer's ad-
vantage. If the case seems to be moving in the plaintiff's favor, the
dealer can, and will, simply settle to avoid an adverse ruling.
There is little evidence of derivatives disputes moving from
court to arbitration. On the other hand, it seems clear that parties
to a derivatives contract may effectively incorporate external law
into an arbitration agreement or may authorize an arbitrator to de-
cide such questions of external law.25 4 Parties also may, by agree-
ment, establish discovery rules, including rules resembling those
applicable to disputes in federal court.255 These benefits might
make arbitration more attractive to derivatives market participants.
The evidence of arbitration agreements in the derivatives mar-
ket is scant and very recent. In late 1999, Panama-based Dorigol
S.A. agreed to arbitrate a derivatives dispute with J.P. Morgan &
Co. before a National Association of Securities Dealers panel.25 6
Dorigol had filed suit in the Southern District of New York, alleg-
M See Randall Smith, Losing a Job on Wall Street These Days Often Doesn't Mean
Losing a Bonus, Too, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2000, at C1, C4 (citing several awards to
employees in bonus disputes with their employer bank).
254 See LAURA J. COOPER ET AL., ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 153 (2000) ("No one
doubts that the parties may authorize the arbitrator to decide external law ques-
tions, either by incorporating the law in the... agreement or by posing the exter-
nal law issue in the submission agreement."). Where private parties have not in-
dicated that particular external law should govern, arbitrators are not constrained
by external law or cases. See id. at 247 (noting that "arbitrators usually do not
treat as conclusive the determinations of administrative agencies or courts").
255 See id. at 225 (describing contract assuring parties access to "all nonconfi-
dential information as is relevant and appropriate to the negotiation, maintenance
and enforcement of this agreement").
256 See Panamanian Firm, J.P. Morgan Agree to Arbitrate $7M Derivatives Case, 5
SEc. LrIG. & REG. REP., Jan. 12, 2000, at 8.
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ing J.P. Morgan committed fraud when it sold Dorigol OTC call
and put option on Brady bonds without disclosing facts it knew
about risks in that market 2 57 Specifically, Dorigol alleged J.P.
Morgan knew it was going to issue a margin call against Long-
Term Capital Management in late 1998 and that such a margin call
would cause the market for emerging market bonds to collapse.X3
In fact, this market did collapse, and Dorigol ultimately lost $7
million on the trades.25 9
Although attorneys for J.P. Morgan were advocating the move
from court to arbitration, attorneys for Dorigol also suggested they
might be better off with an arbitration panel.260 Resisting arbitra-
tion would have been expensive and not necessarily in Dorigol's
best interest Morgan did not disclose its motives in moving to ar-
bitration.
In a similar case, in early 2000, Lehman Brothers Inc. filed a
motion asking the Southern District of New York to stay a suit
against Lehman and to compel arbitrationP1 The plaintiff, Banco
Disa S.A., a Panamanian bank, had filed suit alleging common law
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation,
as well as fraud and misrepresentation under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act, for losses it incurred on several invest-
ments in U.S. Treasury-based derivatives. 62 Again, the parties'
motivations were unclear.
The defendant banks may have been motivated by very large,
recent settlements other banks had agreed to pay in other cases.2 63
257 Id.
23 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id. (quoting one attorney for Dorigol as saying "educating an already
'highly educated' panel about financial derivatives will be much easier than edu-
cating a lay jury").
261 See Lehman Brothers Files Motion to Compel Arbitration in S6.6M Dispute, 5
BANK & LENDER LIAB. LrrG. REP., Jan. 19,2000, at 3.
262 Banco Disa S.A. v. Lehman Brothers Inc., No. 99 Civ. 9487 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
The suit contended that Lehman knew the portfolio was risky and unsuitable, but
pressed the risky strategy in order to make commissions and fees. See 66.6M Dis-
pute, supra note 261, at 3.
2m3 In 1998, several investment banks paid very large settlements to settle
suits related to Orange County's 1994 bankruptcy. Merrill Lynch paid $400 mil-
lion, the fifth-largest settlement in Wall Street history; Morgan Stanley paid S69.6
million; and CS First Boston paid $52.5 million. See Credit Suisse First Boston Settles
Orange County Suit for $52.5 Million, 30 SEc. REG. & L REP. (BNA) 748 (May 15,
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To the extent the motivations were to avoid large settlements en-
couraged by the unpredictability of a jury verdict, the role of arbi-
tration in derivatives disputes might become more substantial over
time, as it has in other areas.264
4. A PROPOSAL FOR "SYNTHETIC COMMON LAW"
Parties to derivatives transactions could eliminate much of the
uncertainty surrounding such transactions by agreeing ex ante to
have a set of hypothetical cases (i.e., "synthetic common law")
govern any future disputes. This Section explains the arguments in
favor of synthetic common law and suggests a few synthetic cases
for parties to use.265
4.1. How Synthetic Common Law Could Govern Disputes
In a synthetic common law system, private law generating as-
sociations would publish menus of cases and commit to resolve
disputes based on those cases. These would be for-profit associa-
tions, established with a view to earning income both by providing
legal rules ex ante and by adjudicating disputes ex post. The asso-
ciations would likely consist of experts in individual fields of law,
perhaps including law professors.
These associations would publish menus of cases. The cases
would involve simplified facts in particular areas of practice and
would focus on the issues that, in the judgment of the association
1998); PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O., supra note 105, at 268. In agreeing to settle these
claims, CS First Boston's CEO, Allen Wheat, noted that "given the magnitude of
the County's losses and the fact that litigation is unpredictable and distracting for
any firm, this settlement is the right course of action." Credit Suisse, supra, at 748.
Similarly, Bear Stearns & Co. paid $39 million to settle a suit brought by three
bankrupt hedge funds alleging fraud in the sale of collateralized mortgage obli-
gations known as "toxic waste." Bear Stearns Settles Granite Partners "Toxic Waste"
CMO Suit for $39M, DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP., Jan. 24, 2000, at 4. The losses, totaling
$225 million, were incurred following the Federal Reserve Board's increase in in-
terest rates in 1994. Id.
264 See supra Section 3.4.
265 1 am including the synthetic cases for illustrative purposes only, and I
would defer to the choices of current derivatives market participants (and their
lawyers) to determine whether particular cases satisfy the expectations of the par-
ties to a particular contract. In fact, it is precisely such deference to the market-
based on the assumption that private parties will choose the cases that most effi-
ciently and fairly would govern any dispute- that is critical to the success of a
synthetic common law regime.
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(and of parties who would choose that association), would most
likely arise in future disputes. The cases could include published
state and federal cases, or examples based on such cases, or even
stylized versions of such cases with certain facts changed or omit-
ted.
Private parties then would select from among these competing
associations a particular menu of cases to govern their contracts.
Numerous associations would compete for a particular contract.
Private parties could simply list, or check a box for, cases they se-
lected as the governing body of legal rules for a particular contract.
The association would then commit to resolve disputes based
on those cases and would in fact adjudicate any such disputes. The
association might describe, or even commit to, its anticipated mode
or process of reasoning in any future dispute.266 The reputation of
the association over time would be based on its ability to keep its
commitments. The association could incorporate information
gleaned from actual cases it adjudicated into new hypothetical
cases for future parties to choose. Associations would compete for
business over time. As with arbitration, courts would have limited
review of association judgments.267 In effect, the association's se-
lected cases would become the body of relevant legal rules.
From the perspective of private parties, a blended system
would be no more complex ex ante than arbitration. Parties would
simply select an association to adjudicate their disputes and then
select from that association's menu of cases a particular set of cases
to govern their contract. The association would adjudicate any
disputes based on the selected menu of cases and the selected
mode of legal reasoning, if applicable.
Parties could select or modify already-decided cases to include
as part of a contract. For example, parties might include Procter &
Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.,2E but eliminate Judge Feikens's
sweeping statement about duties and obligations in swap transac-
tions. Alternatively, parties might adopt the facts of the case but
have the judge in the case refuse to grant summary judgment in
favor of BT, perhaps noting that a fiduciary relationship existed.
266 Parties might also specify ex ante the cost or rate structure for adjudication
and might list acceptable adjudicators.
267 See supra note 120.
263 See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.
Ohio 1996).
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Similarly, parties might adopt the facts of the SEITA case,269 but re-
verse the outcome, or incorporate Press, Independent Foresters, and
Kwiatkowski II into a single, sensible decision.270
In addition, parties could create new cases to govern future
disputes. The following cases are meant to be illustrative, not
comprehensive, and indicate the types of issues that parties might
decide to address in individual cases. In addition, parties could
specify how important certain facts were to the decision in the case
or what type of reasoning they would like an adjudicator to use if
the facts do not match the facts of the case.
First, the regime could reduce uncertainty associated with dif-
ferential statutory coverage of derivatives.271 The parties would
make it clear that federal securities and commodities statutes do
not govern their disputes. For example, the menu of cases could
include the following illustrative case:
Case No. 1: Party A and Party B enter into the derivative
transaction described in the attached term sheet.272 Party B loses
money and sues in federal court, claiming the federal securities
laws should govern the dispute because a derivative is a "secu-
rity. "273 Held: the derivative instrument is not a security.
Note that the above case depends on the acquiescence of the
federal courts. When Party B filed suit, the judge drawing the case
would need to recognize the party's prior agreement to resolve all
disputes through the synthetic common law regime and dismiss
the claim. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's statement that
such dismissal is warranted based on the parties' prior agree-
ment,274 there is some risk that a judge would refuse to dismiss the
269 See Societe Nationale d'Exploitation Industrielle des Tabacs et Allumettes
v. Salomon Bros. Int'l Ltd., No. 113154/96, 1998 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 219 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Feb. 9,1998).
270 See discussion supra notes 147-172 and accompanying text.
271 This uncertainty is described in detail supra Section 3.1.
272 The parties would simply attach or incorporate by reference a copy of the
term sheet for their transaction, once the terms are finalized.
2n The parties could include a similar case excluding the applicability of the
commodities laws as well.
274 The Supreme Court has endorsed the notion of two contracting parties in
different jurisdictions specifying ex ante the law to be applied to their contractual
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claim. In such an event, the parties would bear the litigation costs
associated with an appeal and the litigation risk of a change in Su-
preme Court position. However, this same problem is present for
arbitration generally and does not appear to be serious. In any
event, the costs would be lower than the costs of litigating a federal
claim, which neither party believed ex ante would govern any fu-
ture dispute.
Second, synthetic cases could reduce the uncertainty associated
with ambiguous common law decisions. For example, consider the
case law dealing with lack of authority claims. 7.3 To the extent
parties are concerned, as they seem to be, that one party could
avoid its obligations on a derivatives contract simply by refusing to
pay any losses, the parties could include a case holding that refusal
to pay would be a breach of the derivatives contract, entitling the
non-breaching party to damages under the regime:
Case No. 2: Party A and Party B enter into the derivative
transaction descried in the attached tern sheet. Party B pro-
vides evidence that the transaction is both legal and authorized.276
Party B loses money and is in "default"27 on the transaction.
Party B claims the contract is illegal and unenforceable. Held:
unless another case in this menu establishes othenise,27a Party A
is entitled to payment from Party B of the amount owed.
relationship. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974) (stating
that where the governing law is unclear "[a] contractual provision specifying in
advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to be applied
is, therefore, an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderli-
ness and predictability essential to any international business transaction.").
VS See supra notes 208-227 and accompanying text.
276 Such evidence might include the signed authorization of the board of di-
rectors or particular managers, applicable powers of attorney, or even a video or
audiotape of a conversation in which the purchaser authorized approval of the
transaction.
27 Events of default are specified in great detail in the standard form ISDA
agreement already used by derivatives counterparties. Accordingly, the parties
could simply make reference to that agreement and incorporate the definitions by
reference.
2n For example, another case might hold that if Party A defrauded Party B,
then Party B would not be liable.
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Including such a case in a derivatives contract might resolve
the problem of authority in a way statutes or cases could not. Re-
call the problem associated with the Indonesian statute requiring
board approval, notwithstanding the fact that it often is impracti-
cable to obtain such approval. An Indonesian statute could specify
when a contract will be binding on an Indonesian company even
without the board of commissioner's approval. Alternatively, In-
donesian courts could hear and resolve cases, preferably by re-
ported opinion, in a way that would provide guidance to future
parties. However, neither resolution by statute nor common law
seems likely, given the dearth of finance-related legislation and
cases. Nor does it seem probable that a treaty or executive agree-
ment between Indonesia and another country would allow parties
to choose another, clearer legal regime, with the knowledge that
they would be able to collect and enforce a judgment.
A synthetic common law regime could specify what types of
contracts would require the board of commissioner's approval and
give plenty of examples, based on easy-to-discern variables, such
as notional amount, value-at-risk, and scenario analysis, as func-
tions of revenue, net income, or some other accounting variables.
The parties to the contract could choose the regime that most
closely corresponds to their expectation of which transactions
would be authorized. Unauthorized transactions would be unen-
forceable, although such transactions still might occur with ade-
quate collateral. As an alternative, or perhaps additional, synthetic
case, consider the following:
Case No. 3: Party A and Party B enter into derivative transac-
tions with a notional value in aggregate of $100 million or less.
Party B is an Indonesian company and therefore normally must
obtain the approval of its board of commissioners for any deriva-
tive transactions. Party B loses money on the derivative transac-
tion described in the attached term sheet and fails to pay Party A.
Party B's board of commissioners did not approve the transaction.
Held: the transaction was deemed approved because Party A and
Party B had entered into derivative transactions with notional
value of $100 million or less, and Party A therefore is entitled to
payment from Party B of the amount owed.
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Similar problems arise when the purchaser of derivatives at-
tempts to renege by claiming one of its employees (a "rogue
trader") engaged in unauthorized trading in those instruments.
This issue has arisen in numerous cases, including disputes be-
tween two Chinese companies and Lehman Brothers Inc.,P be-
tween Sumitomo Corp. and several large banks,'40 and between a
Malaysian company and Credit Suisse.28 Many of these suits were
filed under non-U.S. legal regimes that do not recognize the com-
mon law doctrine of apparent authority. As a result, derivatives
sellers need to assure themselves before a transaction occurs that
the agent for the purchaser has actual authority.
A synthetic common law regime would enable the parties to
specify in advance what facts would constitute apparent authority.
For example, the synthetic cases might find that there was author-
ity when an employee with the title "managing director" (or some
similar title) signs a derivatives contract, representing that she has
authority to act on behalf of the purchaser. Or the case might say
that it is not enough to rely on only one signature; two or three are
required. Or the case might require board approval for each trans-
action. In any event, the parties in advance could choose the law
that best fits their situation. Significantly, the fact that parties en-
r9 The suits occurred after China International United Petroleum & Chemi-
cals and China National Metals and Minerals Import & Export Corp. refused to
pay amounts owed to Lehman on various foreign exchange and interest rate de-
rivatives transactions. Each Chinese firm claimed the trades were unauthorized
because the employees who signed the contracts did not have the necessary cor-
porate authority. The argument was simple: if the trades were unauthorized, they
were unenforceable. In each case, Lehman filed suit in the Southern District of
New York for breach of contract. See Victor L. Hou, Derivatives and Dialectics: The
Evolution of the Chinese Futures Market, 72 N.Y.U. L REV. 175,187 (1997).
2=0 Sumitomo sued Union Bank of Switzerland (in Tokyo District Court) and
Chase Manhattan Bank (in the Southern District of New York) claiming that the
banks had made unauthorized loans to Sumitomo's head copper trader who had
engaged in unauthorized copper trading, sustaining losses of $2.6 billion. Sumi-
tomo alleged not only that the banks knew that the trader was not authorized to
take out loans, but that the banks had disguised the loans as derivative swap
transactions to help hide the unauthorized trading. See Bennett & Marin, supra
note 13, at 32-33.
281 Malaysian conglomerate Berjaya Group lost $14 million on a derivatives
transaction between Credit Suisse and Beijaya's Cayman Islands' subsidiary, and
sued in Malaysia High Court, claiming the transaction was unauthorized because
the Berjaya director who entered into the transaction had not obtained the re-
quired approvals. See Stephen Duthie, Berjaya Group Files Suit Over Interest-Rate
Swap, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 7,1995, at 3.
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gaged in deliberations about the choice of synthetic law would be
strong evidence that they considered the authority issue in ad-
vance and that the transaction would be either authorized or not, if
the facts fit one of the hypothetical synthetic cases.
As to other common law claims, the parties could include cases
related to duty-based claims (i.e., breach of fiduciary duty or negli-
gent misrepresentation), describing several relationships and then
concluding for each whether a particular duty existed. Then, if the
parties' relationship changed over time, a duty might or might not
be triggered. The parties could do the same for fraud-related
claims. Cases might specify what type of misrepresentation would
be actionable. Consider the following case:
Case No. 4: Party A and Party B enter into the derivative
transaction described in the attached term sheet. Party A sends
to Party B the attached scenario analysis.282 Party B loses mate-
rially2 83 more money on the derivative than the scenario analysis
282 A scenario analysis indicates how a particular instrument is expected to
perform, given changes in one or more variables. Typically, scenario analysis is
provided by the more sophisticated derivative seller (e.g., Party A) to the less so-
phisticated derivative buyer (e.g., Party B). For example, consider a derivative
contract that paid Party B $10 million x (JPY/USD - 100)/100 minus $10 million,
where JPY/USD is the Japanese Yen to U.S. Dollar exchange rate at the maturity
of the contracL A scenario analysis might resemble the following:
IPY/USD Payment Owed To (From) Party B
120 $2 million
110 $1 million
100 $0 million
90 ($1 million)
80 ($2 million)
If the numbers in the "Gain (Loss) to Party B" column were materially inaccu-
rate, Party A would not be entitled to payment from Party B of any amount owed.
For example, if the term materially was defined to be a deviation of more than one
percent, and the scenario analysis indicated that if JPY/USD = 80, the Payment
Owed To (From) Party B would be ($1 million) when the actual expected amount
owed was double that amount, then Party A would not be entitled to payment of
the $2 million owed to Party A by Party B.
M Materially could be defined to be more than a certain percentage above
the amount of losses indicated in the scenario analysis. If the payoff from the de-
rivative security was linear, the exact amount of loss implied by the scenario
analysis could be calculated simply using linear interpolation. If the payoff from
the derivative security was non-linear, the exact amount of loss implied by the
scenario analysis could be calculated by Party A, with review by the adjudicator
and/or appointed experts.
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had indicated Party B would lose. Held: Party A is not entitled to
payment from Party B of any amount owed, and Party B is enti-
tled to payment from Party A of any amount owed.
A series of similar cases could define the parameters of the ac-
tionable misstatements and thereby define precisely the parame-
ters of any disclaimer statements included in the contracts.VA The
cases would provide a guidepost indicating what sort of behavior
would constitute reasonable reliance by the purchaser.
Descriptions of cases in an ISDA Master Agreement might even
cover which contracts would fall under anti-gambling statutes. 5
For example, synthetic cases involving direct bets on a single eco-
nomic variable (i.e., interest rates, foreign exchange, stock prices)
would be enforceable, whereas cases involving complex bets on
multiple economic variables that could have been made more sim-
ply, or that involve non-economic variables (e.g., bets on a sporting
event), would be unenforceable.
Finally, a synthetic common law regime could incorporate
whatever aspects of private law and private adjudication the par-
ties found to be of value. Nothing in the regime would prohibit
parties from signing a detailed ISDA agreement or from specifying
additional provisions in the form of private law contractual lan-
guage. Neither would the regime prohibit the use of already es-
tablished arbitration or mediation regimes, to the extent they were
to accept the methodology of reasoning by analogy to synthetic
cases. Synthetic common law simply adds another arrow or two to
the quiver.
4.2. Institutional Barriers to Synthetic Common Law
What are the barriers to parties implementing a synthetic
common law regime today? There are several. First, there is no
evidence private parties have actively considered the idea; it may
be the case that no private party has thought to consider such a re-
gime, or that a few parties have considered it, but they either did
not implement the regime or did not publicize their implementa-
tion.
2s4 See supra notes 245-252 and accompanying text.
295 See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
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Second, arbitrators and arbitration systems might benefit from
uncertainty about future decisions. Arbitration regimes appear to
have a degree of market power2S6 and might benefit if their legal
rules and conclusions remain both secret and indeterminate. 287
Synthetic common law would turn arbitration into a much more
commodity-like product than it currently is.
Third, the prohibition of judicial advisory opinions288 prevents
courts from using synthetic common law and might lead some
courts to balk at enforcing awards if the decision used advisory
opinions. The synthetic cases could be considered advisory opin-
ions, although it is arguable they are simply an expression of the
intent of the parties, in case form. Of course, if a federal district
court were directly to implement a synthetic common law regime, it
almost certainly would be reversed. But there is little reason to be-
lieve a court's reliance on such a system, especially given the lim-
ited standards of review of arbitration judgments, would trigger
much appellate court scrutiny.
Fourth, it is possible that there is market failure in the market
for competitive adjudication firms. There is some evidence that the
market for arbitration does not work particularly well, and there
are structural reasons contributing to ineffective competition
among adjudicators. Judge Richard Posner has considered and re-
jected the notion that a competitive industry might evolve in which
adjudicators competed for business, although he seems to have as-
sumed such competition could occur only on an ex post basis.289
286 There are reasons to believe arbitration may be the sort of business that
leads to oligopoly: there are economies of scale associated with arbitration, arbi-
tration may be a natural monopoly, and there may be a path dependence story in
which particular regimes are chosen first and then persist. In any event, there are
only a few arbitration regimes, the market is highly concentrated, and there has
been very little entry into or change in structure of the arbitration industry.
27 Cf. Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corpo-
rate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1927-28 (1998) (making the same indeterminacy
argument for Delaware corporate law).
288 See HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
65-67 (Paul M. Bator et al. eds., 3d ed. 1988). Some state courts do not have a con-
stitutional prohibition against advisory opinions. See Barry Latzer, Whose Federal-
ism? Or, Why "Conservative" States Should Develop Their State Constitutional Law, 61
ALB. L. REv. 1399, 1413 n.56 (1998) (noting that "some state courts, unlike the Su-
preme Court, have no prohibition against advisory opinions.").
289 "Hiring competitive judicial firms is not the answer either, quite apart from
the difficulty of maintaining consistency of legal decisions. Competition doesn't
work well when customers cannot determine even roughly the quality of the out-
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Posner appears not to have considered the possibility of dispute
resolution firms competing on an ex ante basis, as private synthetic
common law services would. In such a competitive environment,
private parties could easily assess the quality of firms, as well as
the menu of already decided cases. Private parties considering
competing firms could examine the cases offered, read any addi-
tional decisions by the firms, examine other representations as to
process or mode of reasoning, and then-after any dispute-com-
pare the result with prior cases and representations. Firms whose
decisions did not match the agreed upon cases would not exist for
long, because they would acquire a reputation for such decisions,
and private parties would not choose them. By writing clear
opinions in the cases it adjudicated, a firm could obtain a competi-
tive advantage over firms not offering such opinions. For example,
parties clearly are able to obtain sufficient information to enable
them to choose which judge in a particular district they would like
to govern their dispute; in fact, the selection of a particular judge
typically drives the parties' litigation strategies.X
Fifth, private law typically has been generated by sophisticated
parties, who benefit from the use of uniform contract terms when
contracting with less sophisticated parties. A few investment
banks, and primarily a single law firm, developed the standard
form ISDA contracts used in the derivatives area, and an unso-
phisticated party is at a great disadvantage when negotiating over
such documents with an investment bank's lawyers. As a result,
many of the ambiguities and omissions in these contracts may be
intentional on the part of the investment bank but unanticipated or
unknown on the part of the less sophisticated counterparty. Syn-
thetic common law might not generate as serious an information
asymmetry problem as private law ISDA provisions, because a de-
scription of the results in particular cases would be more obvious,
even to an unsophisticated counterparty. Suppose a sophisticated
party selects synthetic cases that are unfavorable to the unsophisti-
cated party; at least in this instance, the unsophisticated party
would be able to (and likely would want to) read the cases and
put offered by the competing firms and when warranties or equivalent guarantees
are infeasible." RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 115 (1995).
290 A recent example of this was the initial selection of Judge Thomas Penfield
Jackson to adjudicate the antitrust suit by the U.S. Department of Justice against
Microsoft.
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might even recognize an unfavorable result. In contrast, an unso-
phisticated party presented with a long, standard-form contract
written in broad, general terms is less likely to read the contract
and even less likely to understand it. As noted earlier, particular
contract terms are unlikely to be priced, given the structure of the
derivatives market. If synthetic common law would impose costs
on the more sophisticated party to an established contractual ar-
rangement, that party naturally would oppose the regime.
5. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have analyzed the various approaches to regu-
lating the global market for financial derivatives. The contours of
statutory, judicial, private, and arbitral approaches to regulation
are constantly shifting.
One consistent theme has been the importance of certainty.29'
In every area of derivatives regulation certainty is paramount, yet
is often lacking. In the rapidly evolving markets for complex fi-
nancial instruments, it is increasingly difficult for either public or
private entities to specify useful legal rules ex ante. In addition, as
the cost of resolving disputes in these markets increases, it is more
difficult for judges or arbitrators to resolve disputes in a fair and
efficient manner ex post.
In this article, I have suggested one way parties transacting in
derivatives markets might use synthetic common law to resolve
uncertainty in their relationships. A synthetic common law regime
might capture the ex ante advantages associated with statutes while
preserving the flexibility associated with ex post adjudication.
As our society shifts to more synthesized experiences and vir-
tual realities, it is tempting to stick by what is authentic and real.
Real statutes and common law will always have a place in modem
society, just as some people always will prefer organic food, natu-
ral fur clothing, antediluvian housing, and interacting with human
291 It is difficult to overstate the importance of certainty to the derivatives
markets. Following the uncertainty associated with unwinding transactions in-
volving Long-Term Capital Management in August and September 1998, the vol-
ume of derivatives trading dropped markedly. The Bank for International Settle-
ments said the "most striking development" in the derivatives market during the
first half of 1999 was the sharp decline in foreign exchange contracts, a decline
that began during the second half of 1998. See Global Derivatives Statistics, supra
note 49, at 6.
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beings rather than computers. But in some segments of society, the
cost of holding fast to reality based on subjective or uncertain belief
is too great. Derivatives market participants frequently trade in
synthetic assets, in part because trading in the real underlying as-
sets (e.g., stocks or bonds) is no longer practicable or cost effective.
Perhaps, the same is true of legal rules. If so, it is time to consider
abandoning the reality of law.
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